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THE FUTURE OF FAIRNESS: A SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE
EFFECTS OF COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMMUNICATION AND GLOBAL
MARKET CAPITALISM

A Thesis
Presented
to the Faculty of
California State University Dominguez Hills

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts
in
Humanities

by
Kevin M. Nunley
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
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
THESIS: THE FUTURE OF FAIRNESS: A SOCIAL AND POLITICAL
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COMMUNICATION AND GLOBAL MARKET CAPITALISM

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
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ABSTRACT

Computer-mediated communication (CMC) is a major new form of media, a technological addition that will change lives, communities, societies and relationships. CMC is also having strong effects on political and economic systems with a global power that transcends nations, their borders, and means of regulation. Issues of justice, fairness, and equality are unsettled. The discussion divides into four parts: the state of computer development today and over the next decade, an historical and cultural view of media as a framework for how CMC influences society, analysis of global market economy, and a discussion of social and political philosophies toward developing a theory insuring fairness and equality in the global environment.

INTRODUCTION

Computer-mediated communication (CMC) is a major new form of media, a technological addition that will change lives, communities, societies and relationships. CMC is also having strong effects on political and economic systems. Communication through computers, even in its current early stages, has played a prominent role in enabling economic capital to move in new ways, encouraging market capitalism with a global power that transcends nations, their borders, and means of regulation. Issues of justice, fairness, and equality are unsettled. Presently, there is little system for ensuring basic qualities of life in the global market economy that is rapidly developing with the aid of CMC. As leaders in government, computers, and business search for insights, Philosophy is a valuable tool in the quest to answer the riddle of how fairness will be assured in this new global environment.

These are the assumptions that this paper attempts to explore, explain, and substantiate. All are points involving some controversy. There are prominent schools of thought that believe the importance of CMC is exaggerated, that media has little measurable effect on society, and that the current global economy is not anarchic nor in danger of jeopardizing individual rights.

The discussion that follows divides into four basic parts: the state of computer development today and over the next decade, an historical and cultural view of media as a framework for how CMC influences society, analysis of the global market economy, and a discussion of social and political philosophies toward developing a theory insuring fairness and equality in the global environment.

CHAPTER 1

COMPUTERS, COMMUNICATION AND SOCIETY

Computer-mediated communication (CMC) appears to be a topic of fervent and widespread concern with many saying it is the next big thing in mass communication. Will it bring large scale social and political change to people everywhere? Nicholas Negroponte is one who is euphoric over the possibilities. He is in a good position to see the computerized future. As the founder and director of MIT's Media Lab, he has been charged by the world's industrial powers with performing the hard scientific research that will lead the technological way. Negroponte's job is to invent the future. Clifford Stole, on the other hand, insists that the blissful digital future will never happen. He is in a good position for introspection as a baby-boom astronomer raised on the primordial Internet of American graduate schools in the late 1970s. Stole has lived the past twenty years in lockstep with the evolving computer-mediated community.

Negroponte and Stole are merely prominent landmarks on the landscape of the debate. Twenty years of studies are leading to varied conclusions based on massive collections of data. Prominent thinkers are lining up on both sides of the digital isle.

Negroponte's battle cry in his book Being Digital, a collection of his articles that appear regularly in Wired magazine, is "the future is here and it is digital" (1). It is a clear case of technology driving society whether society really wants it or not. If ever there was a vivid example of technological determinism, Negroponte's confident insistence on a

digital vision of the future could indicate just such a scenario. "The change from atoms to bits is irrevocable and unstoppable." He continues:

The slow human handling of most information in the form of books, magazines, newspapers, and video cassettes, is about to become the instantaneous and inexpensive transfer of electronic data that move at the speed of light. In this form, information can become universally accessible.

(Negroponte 4)

By "universally accessible," Negroponte does not necessarily mean that vast amounts of information will be cheaply available to all peoples of greatly varying economic and educational status all over the world. He is talking more in terms of information becoming accessible to a great many other forms of technology. In MIT labs, common dumb household items come to life with computer-chip artificial intelligence, communicating with each other and anticipating our human moods, patterns and preferences. Writer Timothy Harper, who visited Negroponte's lab, observes that in MIT's rapidly developing future your refrigerator will sense that milk is running low, but it will not phone the dairy for milk delivery if it anticipates you will be leaving on vacation tomorrow. "The back door will unlock itself when you approach with arms full of groceries" (Harper 90). And the massive amount of e-mail that many fear will daily constipate our lives will be sorted by software robots that live on the Internet and sort incoming information-- combining, deleting and presenting a final package that perfectly represents our past preferences and present concerns.

Negroponte's most emphatic emphasis for change comes with perhaps the greatest

communication technology the world has ever known: television. While MIT's researchers are working on grandiose holograms, where twenty years from now we will watch the Super Bowl played by life-sized holographic players on our living room floor, Negroponte warns of a vastly different television that is already possible. In the newly digital present, televisions can be equipped with computers which allow programming to be downloaded instantly from digital lines. A week's worth of shows can be harvested off the wires in seconds, sorted by the TV's digital processor which gangs together your favorite shows and chops out the commercials. This right to provide the digital entryway into millions of American homes has fueled the bitter congressional battle between cable and telephone companies.

Ultimately, Negroponte's goal is not unlike that of the computer future's most ardent critics. The point is not to get people to understand computers, but to get computers to understand people.

Clifford Stole is much more skeptical. He takes aim in particular at the sensory deprived Internet: "Life in the real world is far more interesting, far more important, far richer, than anything you'll ever find on a computer screen" (Stole 13). He warns that CMC is being oversold and that our expectations are racing well beyond what the technology will be able to provide. His work often reads like Socrates' calls for a return to an oral society, reminding readers that the on-line world has only a pseudo-reality. "During that week you spend on line, you could have planted a tomato garden, volunteered at a hospital, spoken with your child's teacher, and taught the kid down the street how to shag fly balls" (Stole 14). Stole finds the benefits of face-to-face human

interaction to be rich and wholly lacking in CMC, liking it to a quote from Thoreau's Walden, improved means to an unimproved end.

While Stole warns of the ill effects of CMC's lack of human quality, Thomas Landauer, a psychologist and veteran computer researcher, asserts the computer's shortcomings with an alarming mountain of hard data and solid analysis. In Landauer's view, the computer is responsible for the two-decade slow down of world productivity. During this period the world's business profits have been poured back into the purchase of computers and the technology has not delivered as promised. His book The Trouble With Computers is based on four "apparent facts":

1. Computers have not contributed nearly as much to labor productivity as we had hoped, were promised, believed--or, by rights, they should.
2. For the jobs most people do in service enterprises, most computer applications make work only a little more efficient.
3. The efficiency effects of computer applications designed in traditional ways are improving very slowly, if at all.
4. Efficiency effects of applications designed with the new, user-centered methods improve very rapidly. (Landauer xii-xiii)

Like Negroponte, Landauer believes the answer to the computer's problems lies in making its workings, functions, and especially interface more human-friendly. The triumphs and failures of computers become more understandable when analyzing performance data. Phase one of computer development has centered on the performance of tasks that can be reduced to logical or numerical operations, something which

computers do extremely well. This initial phase is running out of steam. The second phase involves computers attempting to take over a wide range of tasks that people do, tasks that simply cannot be reduced to a numerical formula. Computers have been built to work as assistants and aids. Landauer insists, "It is here, in the design of these kinds of computer systems, that we have failed" (7).

If the hard data show that people are having a difficult time making computers work for them, why is the popular belief so strong that computers will deliver us into a promised future where life is easier, peaceful, and exciting? Surprisingly, this important question hardly ever surfaces in the literature, even from those writers who are critical of the digital movement. Landauer was the only theorist in this study who even attempted to provide any clues to the apparently wide-spread mythological belief in the magical powers of the computer. He accuses computer manufacturers of practicing "their own special brand of insidious hucksterism."

The whole population seems to be having a bit of trouble telling the difference between science-fiction and reality these days. Media fantasy has gotten so realistic, and real technology so fantastic, that the dividing line is fuzzy. (Landauer 184-85)

Indeed, the slick special effect laden television commercials that computer conglomerates use to hawk their wares to the public have little to nothing to do with computers. Digital fish swirling around the head of a blonde-haired child flawlessly superimposed on a greatly magnified circuit board is really a commercial for the impressive wonders of high-end television effects processors. The consumer who is

seduced to drool over a computer in a commercial is really salivating over a \$100,000 piece of television effects processing. Advertising often sells the sizzle, the sex-appeal, and not the advantage. Perhaps better stated, the advantage desired by the consumer is emotional rather than rational. The computer has taken center stage among the group of technologies in which modern humankind puts a religious faith.

The explosive expansion of CMC has lately triggered urgent interest in the social effects that must be accompanying the phenomenon. During the past few years, some publishers have quickly assembled university textbooks compiled from papers written in the late 1980s and early 1990s. One such offering is Information Technology and Society written and edited by a group of English scholars centered around the Open University. These writers make a concerted, almost laborious effort to send home the idea that technology does not drive society. Instead, society creates and influences technology. They make the point that society creates the environment for the invention of a new technology. Social, political, and organizational factors shape the development of the technology. In the end, society determines if and how the technology will be adopted and used. In the 1890s, when the telephone was quickly and enthusiastically gaining universal adoption throughout the United States, people in England regarded the telephone as an unwanted intrusion and mixer of social classes. Victorian England's tightly stratified class system did not need a communication device that connected everyone. North America's much more equalitarian society welcomed it. Parts of Europe used the telephone as Alexander Bell originally envisioned it, as a kind of cable radio to bring information and entertainment into the home over a connected speaker. Telephones in the hands of

common Americans quickly mutated into an open and low-cost system of personal communication. While Russia moved to keep the telephone out of the hands of the proletariat, Ma Bell executives responded to political pressure by installing a free community telephone (usually in drug stores) in every village in America.

Meanwhile, Ray Thomas of the Open University, expresses concern that the equalitarian history of electronic communication may be changing as CMC progresses. Popular visions of the technological future "focus on the lives of the relatively privileged and affluent members of human societies and on the prospects for information technology developments in relatively advanced industrialized countries" (Thomas 90-91). He warns that most accounts fail to point out that underprivileged people in industrial societies and almost all members of developing societies have limited or no access to information technologies. It is alarming to contrast African society, where there is only one radio per 18 people and television and telephones are rarely, if ever, seen; with a recently published photo of a an elementary school classroom in Australia where an all-girl class is bunched around a dozen laptop computers scattered along the floor.

The article intones, "Ownership of the notebook computer would reinforce ownership of the knowledge constructed within it" (Stager 78). This is strikingly similar to anthropologists' observations of traditional peoples who do not read, yet keep a single book (often a book that is totally unrelated to anything in the villager's experience) in the village as if it contains magical power, inspiration, and a vision for an improved future. Could it be that industrialized people love computers because once they own one they can imagine taking personal possession of all the knowledge (and associated power) in the

world? The home computer as household shrine takes on the same iconic meaning of high culture, wisdom and privilege that the Steinway piano did at the turn of the century. No young woman could grow up to be proper, cultured, and well married without a piano in the living room. Today, no girl can master the skills and mobility formerly given solely to men if she is not nurtured by age eight with a laptop computer.

More important than the lack of expensive digital hardware in developing societies is the increasing consideration of information as a commercial commodity. Famed author and technologist Author C. Clarke, whose pioneering work in the 1940s and 1950s paved the way for communication satellites, lived his last forty years in Sri Lanka. He was uniquely qualified to comment on the effects of information technology on developing peoples and makes this observation: "Increasingly in recent years (CNN beginning in mid-1991), satellite transmissions of all kinds are being scrambled as information becomes more and more of a commercial commodity" (Clarke 237). Television from village satellite dishes has long been an important source of information from the outside and a crucial boon to social and individual awareness and change. One must wonder if the break-up of the communist Eastern Block could have taken place in the current climate of scrambled signals and information as protected commodity.

David Lyon warns that similar encroachments on free and cheap information will have deep and disrupting effects on the less affluent in Western industrialized societies:

Within capitalism, private gain is constantly set against efforts to 'socialize' production. In the late twentieth century, the latent potential for trade in information--for this entity to become a commodity--is

being realized. While many undoubtedly gain from this process, others lose. Public libraries and public service broadcasting are both time-honoured concepts whose 'public' status is under threat as information has a price put on it. (Lyon 68)

Lyon wrote this seven years prior to demands from Newt Gingrich and many members of Congress that public broadcasting be weaned from public funding and cast into the commercial sea. While House Republicans accused public broadcasting of being elitist, recently increasing dependence on the well-to-do members of society for financial contributions has forced program producers to target their broadcasts more and more to the white, educated, urban, middle-aged, wealthy male. For the National Public Radio producer, the perceived average audience member has a graduate degree and earns a minimum of \$40,000 per year. As with all of information technology, commercial forces are making public broadcasting go where the money is and that means programming toward the privileged.

Ray Thomas of the Open University also sees the commercialization of information technology driving further apart the haves from the have-nots. He points out that "Communication is essential to the way human communities are usually created and maintained" and notes that while access to the technology promises a sense of global unity, many populations will be left out (Thomas 70). Members of the most industrialized nations earn ten times the income of most of Africa and South East Asia. While American schools are fretting over the purchase of crates of laptop commuters, African villagers are struggling to buy batteries for a single transistor radio. The effect on global progression

will not be unlike a developmentally disabled small child who receives stimulation from therapists at a very early age. The parts of the brain that are dysfunctional improve very slowly while the undelayed areas of the brain are caused to race ahead. Later in life the individual evidences "splinter knowledge" where some abilities are abnormally advanced while others are still years behind. Such could be the effect on the global brain as affluent societies are massaged with CMC stimulation while others are left running in place.

Much has been said and written about Bill Gates, founder and CEO of Microsoft. As one of the world's wealthiest men, his dominating position over the computer industry makes him the object of fawning emulation as well as scandalous disdain. His recent book on the state of computer development, The Road Ahead, is a serious and surprisingly unbiased effort to convey Gates' bird's-eye view of his industry. Because he is so well placed with industry experience and information, Gates qualifies rather exceptionally to comment on computer development and use. Also, because he holds immense influence and power that allow him to make even his most outlandish visions into reality, Gates' predictions for the future hold a special weight.

There is not as much distance between the naysayers of Internet utility and the expectations of Bill Gates as one might imagine. Gates admits "the sudden popularity of the Internet surprised me. My mistakes were underestimating how many people were willing to use a relatively slow network and underestimating the frenzy of Internet content generation that would take place" (107). Indeed, from 1996 to 1997, the number of web pages on the Internet increased from 10 million to 150 million. The slowness of Internet connections is a factor that many critics fail to see as a temporary hindrance. The

“twisted-pair” copper phone wires that connect most households around the world are, in places, being rapidly replaced by higher grade lines that carry a great deal more data at much higher speeds. The current narrowband connections transfer data at about 50,000 bits of information per second. The broadband connections that will be available to many within the next ten years will transmit at least two million bits per second while pushing as high as six million bits per second for better quality video. Gates believes that only then when the new infrastructure is in place will the era of the information highway actually arrive. The Internet’s current slow trickle of text and grainy still photos will be replaced by rapid-fire, interactive sound and moving video. Rather than putting one’s brochures on a web site, as seems the case today, web publishers will more resemble television producers with their own private channels for massive distribution. Gates points to the equalitarian state of Internet publishing:

The Internet is a publishing medium with entry barriers lower than any we’ve ever seen--the greatest self-publishing vehicle ever. Its proliferation of bulletin boards, newsgroups, and Web pages demonstrates the changes that take place when millions of people have access to low-friction distribution and anybody can post messages, images, or software. (141)

This unregulated phenomenon of mass participation and cooperation is one of the aspects that most impresses Internet experts. Gates sees a host of resulting positive effects. Intranets (private internets, usually within companies) are promoting the sharing of information within previously hierarchical organizations where information was carefully segmented from the views of workers. Because of computer communication’s

ability to make physical size and location irrelevant, small organizations can appear the same as large corporations. Individuals with specialized interests can find and communicate with similar others anywhere in the world, promoting small group interaction. Because the Internet groups people without regard to place or national boundary, and is largely beyond the control of municipalities, national boundaries will begin to mean less and less in terms of culture, organization, and power.

Gates is not oblivious to the fact that most of the world's inhabitants have no prospect of gaining Internet access any time soon. "Two-thirds of the world's people have never made a phone call" (Gates 272). Gates' highly publicized venture Teledesic has plans to "use a large number of low-orbit satellites to provide two-way broadband service to the whole world" (Gates 271). If successful, this would mean that people in many developing nations would go from having no telephone service to immediately gaining transmission of a high quality unknown to most Americans. Gates sees this development as necessary ("The Internet won't attract enough great content to thrive if only the most affluent ten percent of society can get to it" [292]). "Before the use of the global interactive network can be come fully integrated into society, a computer hooked up to the Internet must be available to every citizen, not just the elite" (Gates 291). Those unable to afford a home computer will be able to access the Internet at a library, a school, a post office, or a public kiosk.

Gates embraces free market capitalism in conjunction with democracy, and realizes that democracy cannot exist when large numbers of people are excluded from the dominant communication and participation medium. Gates insists that "society will have

to decided how to subsidize broad access so that all users will be equal, both geographically and socioeconomically” (293).

Michael Dertouzos, director of the MIT Laboratory for Computer Science, has been involved in computer-mediated communication since its beginning and is noted for viewing the prospects of a computerized world with moderation and cautious optimism. Interestingly, he emphatically sees the lack of equality between those with computer access and those without as dangerously swelling the gap between rich and poor:

This inequality of information’s value for rich and poor gives rise to an unfortunate instability. With the productivity gains made possible by all the information and information tools at their disposal, the rich nations and rich people of the world will improve and expand their economic goods and services, thereby getting richer. As they get richer they will leverage the Information Marketplace even further, thereby experiencing exponentially escalating economic growth. The poor nations and poor people, by contrast, can’t even get started. They will tend to under use information resources, because they can’t afford them. They will gain no such leverage. There will be no rising spiral. They will stand still, which in relative terms means falling exponentially further behind the rich. (241)

Over and over again, Dertouzos warns that if “*left to its own devices, the Information Marketplace will increase the gap between rich and poor countries and between rich and poor people*” (241).

He concludes, “The broad leverage of information that makes it so attractive to wealthy nations and wealthy people is also what makes it so devastating in its absence for the poor. We must help ensure that with respect to this critical gap the Information Marketplace is not left to its own devices” (Dertouzos 243).

When Dertouzos repeatedly warns against leaving the Information Marketplace to its own devices, he is referring to computer-mediated communication’s development in the current climate of market capitalism. This is an important ingredient in the future of fairness in a computerized world, and an aspect that we will look at in detail later.

Neil Postman, a prominent media theorist, sees the drawbacks of a computer-dominated world as the tip of the iceberg. The rush to computerize every corner of life is the symptom of a larger social phenomenon that Postman refers to as “Technopoly.” For Postman, the United States is the world’s only true technopoly (as of his 1992 writing). In the environment of technopoly, traditional philosophies handed down from prior generations are abandoned rather completely. A faith in technology becomes the center of belief. “Society is best served when human beings are placed at the disposal of their techniques and technology . . . human beings are, in a sense, worth less than their machinery” (Postman 52). The problems that technology causes are solved with additional technology. Material scientists report they are on the verge of entering a new age of technological wonders now that we have an unprecedented power to understand, control and manipulate the material world. Meanwhile, George Dyson has written a book on the history of artificial intelligence, showing that the dream of machine as man has been with us for centuries. Dyson optimistically believes that evolutionary nature is on the side

of the machines. Even though such veteran computer scientists as Dertouzos say that computers who think like humans are lifetimes in the future (if ever), Dyson's book has become somewhat of a rage among computer professionals (Maney 8B). While the reality of the theory may be remote, the dream is very much alive in the thoughts, motivations, and actions of those who develop computer technology. As Postman would have it, members of the technopoly move further and further away from what is natural to biological man and woman.

Postman's theory is largely one of conservatism. In the domination of technology, man and woman are separated from older ways of life and thought processes that more closely accommodated the nature of humans. Technopoly is counter to what is innate, biologically fitted, and in harmony with the natural tendencies of human thought. The flood of information that technology makes possible is at odds with the human need to simplify data into patterns that can form theories.

That is the function of theories--to oversimplify, and thus to assist believers in organizing, weighting, and excluding information. Therein lies the power of theories. Their weakness is that precisely because they oversimplify, they are vulnerable to attack by new information. (Postman 77)

And, because we live in a world where the flood of information is relentless, theory is constantly under attack. Humans lose much of their main source of understanding, belief, and stability. Very simply, humans thrive in stability and predictability. The modern crush of information daily shakes that stability.

While Postman is applying this concept to the effects of our ultra-technological

society, the basic theme has been associated with media for thousands of years. We are much better able to understand and predict the consequences of computer-mediated communication if we consider the effects of media down through the ages, looking for corollaries and commonalties.

CHAPTER 2

MEDIUM THEORY: UNDERSTANDING THE EFFECTS OF MEDIA ON SOCIETY

One of the doctoral alumni from Postman's department of communication at New York University is media and social theorist Joshua Meyrowitz, who in 1985 pointed to a broader way of looking at the ways media shapes society.

While social scientists have focused on the study of media messages, a few scholars in fields outside of communication, sociology, and psychology have taken a more historical and cross-cultural approach to communication technologies and have tried to call attention to the potential effects of media apart from the content they convey. I use the singular, 'medium theory,' to describe this research because what makes it different from other "media theory" is its focus on the particular characteristics of each individual medium. (Meyrowitz 16)

Meyrowitz's departure from experimental studies, replacing them with a broad look at history and culture might be of particular interest to the philosopher. It interjects a large role for media into the history of ideas. The insight that this method reveals is perhaps our best bet of understanding and predicting the social effects of CMC. The lessons of history tend to repeat themselves, and no new media is as different from old media as it may at first seem.

Harold Innis was a political economist with a strong interest in history. His

apparently original idea was that the primary communication medium of a society has dramatic effects on that society's other characteristics. Media, the flow and preservation of information, determined size, shape and structure of its society. This concept profoundly influenced a fellow faculty member at the University of Toronto. Marshall McLuhan, whose popularity reached stellar heights in the 1960s and early 1970s, never made any secret of the intellectual debt he owed to the ideas and inspiration Innis had provided in the late 1940s.

Innis began in the 1930s with a theory that newspapers had been of tremendous economic importance in North America due to the paper pulp industry it supported. In the end he extended this connection between media and social structure down through history to antiquity.

His connection between empire and improved means of communication seems probable:

The written record signed, sealed, and swiftly transmitted was essential to military power and the extension of government. Small communities were written into large states and states were consolidated into empire. The monarchies of Egypt and Persia, the Roman Empire, and the city-states were essentially products of writing. (Innis, Empire 10)

The nation-wide mega-store chains of today, made possible by computer network and fax, are the continuation of a pattern of extension made possible by communication media.

In oral society, before the invention of writing and materials that could be carried, an

administrator would have to send messages to far away places via a runner who had memorized its contents in some easy to remember formula such as a rhyme or legend. It is easy to see that such restrictions on communication would limit the detail that a message could be reliably counted on to deliver to the receiver. Intricate instructions, facts, or numbers could not be sent without the probability that they would be forgotten or misinterpreted. There was also the possibility that the receiver, unable to write the message down, would easily forget it in a short time. Administration was prevented from exercising most of the principles and concepts that are indispensable today. Rule was completely dependent upon the spoken word and the hearer's ability to remember it.

Eric Havelock, in Preface to Plato, one of the towering contributions to medium theory, suggested that Plato's importance is due to the fact that he represents civilization's switch from an oral society to one that was, for the first time, heavily literate. As Havelock states, "For Plato, reality is rational, scientific and logical, or it is nothing" (Preface 25). This primordial emergence of what we think of as modern logic was a product of a significant number of people in the society knowing how to read. Plato's ideas seem familiar and enlightened to us because he is at the point where civilization is changed forever by the writer and the reader. This important modification of communication changed thought patterns; therefore, changing the nature of reality and experience into one that was alien to pre-literate society but seems natural and right to us today.

Our inattention to the nature of a totally oral society lies in our arrogance of literacy: the mistaken view that identifies intelligence with reading and believes that civilization

started with writing. As Havelock points out, "A culture can somehow rely totally on oral communication and still be a culture" (Origins 6) Advanced Greek culture developed independently from literacy. The Greeks, between about 1100 and 700 BC, were completely non-literate. "Yet it was precisely in these centuries that Greece invented the first forms of that social organization and artistic achievement which became her glory" (Havelock, Origins 4). Without literacy, Greece created republic and reason.

In a society with no newspapers or books, knowledge was preserved and passed on by the poets, who sang or chanted traditional works in mnemonic fashion. Their words and sentences were, out of necessity, designed to be memorized and repeated. The characters and content of the poem were traditional and familiar. Havelock points out, "Bold invention is the prerogative of writers in a book culture" (Preface 47). Without writing to aid memory, pre-literate poets and their audiences had to rely on story types and techniques that were conducive to long-term memorization. The same, the routine, and the familiar helped in that respect. Newness was an enemy that crept in as the memory faded.

Innis reminds us that the earliest writing, marked in stone or on dried clay tablets, was not easily moved. Rather than allowing messages to be sent long distances, such writing provided the ability to preserve ideas for many to see, unchained, for long periods of time. The outcome, according to Innis, "The position of the monarch was strengthened by development of the idea of immortality" (Empire 13). Later, as stone was replaced by writing on papyrus, prestige moved from the central absolute monarch to a larger group of readers and writers. The result was a more democratic society.

Papyrus also allowed messages, for the first time, to be sent long distances without the need for simplification or the threat of distortion. Rather than providing for a civilization that could last a long time, papyrus encouraged a society to spread its influence and control for great distances. Innis insists that mobile writing was the spark that created the Roman Empire. "In the empire," he writes, "books became instruments of literary propaganda...The written tradition dependent on papyrus and the roll [the primordial book] supported an emphasis on centralized bureaucratic administration. Rome became dependent on the army, territorial expansion, and law at the expense of trade and international economy" (Innis, Empire 106-107).

By the eighth century, the spread of Mohammedism isolated Europe from the Egyptian supply of papyrus. It was replaced by parchment made from animal hides. The product was perfectly suited to production by a wide-spread agricultural economy. Since the means of writing were no longer restricted to those who could control trade and supplies, the switch to parchment led to decentralization of information and power. Innis concludes that this development led to the fall of Rome and the rise of the Church in its place and to the "growth of a monopoly of knowledge and to its breakdown following the introduction of paper" (Empire 117).

Paper production entered western Europe about the time of the commercial revolution around 1275. It also coincided with the introduction of Arabic numerals. The combination of paper and numbers "enormously enhanced the efficiency of commerce" (Innis 128). The black plague dramatically lowered the population, creating a concentration of wealth in fewer individuals. A fad for flaxen underwear soon led to a

huge supply of surplus rags, the ingredient needed for paper. "In contrast with parchment, which could be produced over wide areas," Innis points out, "paper was essentially a product of the cities in terms of cheap supplies of rags and markets. The control of monasteries in rural districts over education was replaced by the growth of cathedral schools and universities in cities" (Empire 128).

Compared to parchment, papyrus and stone, paper was cheap and available to almost anyone. It resulted in the unprecedented spread of the works of human intelligence. With the introduction of Plato and Aristotle in the West, "knowledge passed from...total darkness to nearly perfect light" (Innis, Empire 130).

The advent of the letter press created a cross-cultural explosion of information and ideas, the lower classes learning to read and write in larger numbers than is often assumed. Eight million books were printed in the first fifty years following Gutenberg, perhaps more than all the scribes of Europe had produced in the previous 1000 years.

Elizabeth Eisenstein believes that while the new print shops had much in common with other new machine-driven enterprises of the early-modern period in western Europe, there was a distinct difference brought on by the informational/communicational nature of print. Whereas other shops might be weaving clothing or purifying metals, the printer was immersed in agitation and propaganda, advertising and publicity, and in lexicography and bibliography. The early printer was a pioneer in these forms at a time when their effectiveness and importance were speeding forward. The important social result was that early print shops served as a gathering place for scholars, artists, literati, foreign translators, and emigrants and refugees. They served as centers for advanced learning and

as a clearing house for every sort of intellectual and cultural exchange. The modern equivalent would be to contrast a Taco Bell restaurant with a radio station. Both can cost about a million dollars, but the social importance of the radio station as a focal point for the communal culture is vastly greater.

This rich confluence or mixing of backgrounds, roles, classes and ideas was a great change from the society of medieval times. Previously, almost all the population of Europe had resided in small homogenous villages that were rarely penetrated by outsiders. Even the towns were of relatively small size with the largest cities only reaching populations of a few hundred thousand. In terms of population and its distribution, Europe then looked more like Montana. The print shop destroyed the homogeneity and broadcast it to the world. Many print shops were "an almost incredible mixture of the sweat shop, the boarding house and the research institute" (Eisenstein 57). In this atmosphere, classes mixed. The university man and the lettered monk, who had been isolated in scribal culture, were now working side by side with members of the lower laboring and trade classes. In this rubbing of shoulders, the author became intimate with the commoner and it is more than likely that quite a few commoners learned the skills necessary to be authors.

Again, this leveling of classes in a much more equalitarian atmosphere had an impact beyond the walls of the print shop due to the very nature of print: identical copies of messages, often with a point of view, being distributed in very large numbers over vast areas to a widely-varying assortment of readers. This important social innovation could have been a factor in later movements. As commoners came closer to the lettered, they

eventually gained the reins to the means of mass communication. Did this set up the climate necessary for the finally successful Reformation and the drive for a one-to-one relationship with God? Meanwhile, there is no question that the equalitarian beginning of the printer's shop was an important factor in the character of early America when one individual, often of a common class, could serve as writer and publisher for many readers.

The great expansion of available reading material made possible by the letter press allowed for another innovation that led to a remarkable explosion of ideas. More books increased the previously rare opportunities to compare different texts. "Contradictions became more visible; divergent traditions more difficult to reconcile. Even while confidence in old theories was weakened, an enriched reading matter also encouraged the development of new intellectual combinations and permutations" (Eisenstein 74). As is believed by modern proponents of multi-disciplinary education, early-modern Europe found the mixing of views and disciplines an extraordinary accelerator of ideas. "The veritable explosion of 'creative acts' during the seventeenth century---the so-called 'century of genius'---can be explained partly by the great increase in possible permutations and combinations of ideas" (Eisenstein 75).

Print immediately began to change the scale of human association. To hear a town speaker, people had to gather together. When the public speaker was replaced by a printed report, people had to depart to private quarters to read it. The printing press "encouraged a sharper division between private life and public affairs" (Eisenstein 131-133). Society moved from one that drew people out of their homes to communicate with each other to one where people stayed inside to communicate privately in print. Again,

we see the socially alienating effects of print. On the other hand, the wide distribution of identical material provided an impersonal relationship between people who were unknown to each other. The concept of the national or continental audience developed. The wide dissemination of standardized editions, creating national communities of people with identical information and beliefs, was a precursor to the intense nationalism that followed. This was especially true in the fiercely nationalistic nineteenth century when the European peasant learned to read. It was also a major factor in the American pre-revolution.

Printing also affected private home life. "An unending stream of moralizing literature penetrated the privacy of the home and helped to precipitate a variety of domestic dramas" (Eisenstein 133). The modern equivalent would be the concern, now validated through research, that the large number of news and police programs showing real violence is greatly increasing the average person's fear of danger and the belief that violent crime is pervasive. Early print similarly created problems where none had existed before. As books and reading become more prevalent, women began to read and provided a market for their own literature. Books were also written especially for children. This difference between the printed material for men from that for women, which was different from children's books, served to increase the concept of differences between sexes and ages.

With knowledge now available in books, young people could by-pass the traditional lifetime of experience previously needed for wisdom and learning. Old age began to lose its prestige and place in the society as the oral culture need for a long memory to preserve information faded.

Innis proposes that the result of printing was the Reformation, and the result of the

ideological attacks of the Reformation was the development of modern science. "Belief in the scriptures defeated attempts to merge the Hebrew and the classic tradition. Science emerged as a result of the break. A concern with nature rather than mind emphasized truth obtained from things rather than books" (Innis, Empire 151). Enter the modern age of the observable, verifiable, scientific observation as the bed of truth.

The next step was the introduction of electronic communication, to which Innis believed World War II resulted from a clash between newspapers and radio. The real development of medium theory regarding electronic media was to come over a decade later, when television swept the country and Marshall McLuhan, standing on Innis' shoulders, established himself as the oracle of the electronic age.

Marshall McLuhan died a man unpopular in many quarters, intensely disliked by a great many scholars who must have had no idea about what he wrote. It is the opinion of this writer that he may have given his audience entirely too much credit for having the background to understand the effects of media on civilization through millennia of history. He exercised a prodigious inter-disciplinarianism that put to work Literature, History, and Anthropology with a depth that many communication researchers were unfamiliar. In a 1967 review of McLuhan: Hot and Cool, a compilation of commentaries ranging from fawning to scathing, a journalist wrote, "this group has said it all. McLuhan the Prophet, McLuhan the Poet, McLuhan the Fake Social Scientist, McLuhan the Shoddy Scholar, McLuhan the Erudite Pop Philosopher" (Watson, back cover). So it went. While McLuhan's ideas were understood and appreciated by the medium theorists, the hostility of the academic community encouraged some of them to distance themselves so as not to

be seen as McLuhanites. Elizabeth Eisenstein, in the preface to her remarkable work The Printing Press as an Agent of Change, told of how running across a copy of McLuhan's Gutenberg Galaxy permanently changed the focus of her research but led to the "McLuhan" problem:

Although Marshall McLuhan's work stimulated my historical curiosity, among many of my colleagues it has been counter-productive, discouraging further investigation of print culture or its effects. Concern with the topic at present is likely to be regarded with suspicion, to be labeled 'McLuhanite' and dismissed out of hand. I hope my book will help to overcome this prejudice and show that the topic is not incompatible with respect for the historian's craft. (Eisenstein xvii)

Joshua Meyrowitz, while embracing McLuhan as a cornerstone inspiration to his theory, does not fail to point out McLuhan's lack of acceptance for twenty years after the appearance of Understanding Media:

McLuhan's star burned as briefly as it burned brightly. The attention given to McLuhan's theories on television and radio, and in books, newspapers and magazines served as a double-edged sword. It brought the idea of non-content media analysis to the consciousness of wide segments of the population in the late 1960s and early 1970s, but the equation of the study of medium effects with McLuhan's style turned many scholars away from serious attention to the subject. By the time of his death in 1980, McLuhan had lost on both fronts: Many of his terms

still echoed—but without much understanding—in popular arenas, and his conceptual frameworks had been banished from most scholarly forums. (Meyrowitz 22)

McLuhan still had his believers in the academic community. When Meyrowitz could write a book in 1985 that was clearly based on medium as change agent and garner boundless praise from virtually every corner, it was obvious that many of McLuhan's ideas had come of age.

Neil Postman, writing an editorial letter as Chair of the Department of Culture and Communication at New York University, recently said:

In the first place, there are important university programs in media studies...that had their roots in McLuhan's ideas and that have continued, over a period of two decades, to keep those ideas central in research and teaching. Second, most of the several hundred university communication programs in the country reflect in varying degrees the question that McLuhan insisted be addressed: To what extent do the *forms* of human communication modify our sensory experience, psychic habits, social relations, and political ideas? Those of us at NYU and elsewhere have never stopped addressing the question. (Postman, Redux 10)

To the suggestion that McLuhan may be making a comeback, Postman says, "more academics and intellectuals are recognizing where their ideas about media come from" (Redux 10).

Everett Rogers points out that the struggle between media effects and media processes as dominant points of view dates back to the late 1940s when the first Communication

programs were established in Psychology departments at Yale and the University of Illinois. This pushed media study firmly into the quantitative, variance-based, experimental camp, while sometimes debasing process-oriented theories as not science, but "literature". McLuhan openly taunted mainstream methodology many times. He did so characteristically in The Gutenberg Galaxy when explaining modern typographic man's mainly visual orientation:

Scientists are happiest when they can get their data with the aid of some dial or other device which can be read by vision. Thus heat, weight, length, and many other things that in ordinary life are apprehended through senses other than vision have become for science matters of visual awareness of the positions of mechanical pointers. (McLuhan 73)

Does this not imply that if we can devise a consistent means of translating all aspects of our world into the language of one sense only, we shall then have a distortion that is scientific because it is consistent and coherent?

The dominance of one sense is the formula for hypnosis. And a culture can be locked in the sleep of any one sense. The sleeper awakes when challenged in any other sense (McLuhan, Gutenberg 73).

This passage tells more than just an indication that much science can be discounted as visual hypnosis. It gets at McLuhan's basic thesis: "any extension of the sensorium by technological dilation has a quite appreciable effect in setting up new ratios or proportions among all the senses" (Gutenberg 35). As Innis pointed out, any change in the balance of sensory perception created ripples of change all through society. Print had skewed literate man's sensory balance far in favor of the visual. More important though, electronic

media's new secondary orality (to borrow Walter Ong's term) had again upset the sensory balance, now in favor of a print-based orality. This, indeed, was a very different balance from what had existed any time during print, scribal, or pre-literate society. McLuhan's new sensory balance suggested remarkable new effects on individuals and society, and he and others attempted to explain many of the unusual events of the 1960s with this idea.

Meyrowitz points out:

Writing in 1961 and 1963, McLuhan drew a surprisingly accurate picture of what would be happening in the streets of New York, San Francisco, Washington, and other American and European cities between 1967 and 1972. McLuhan wrote of widescale social change, of "retribalization," of the decline of traditional feelings of nationalism, of the demand on the part of youth and minorities and others for "in-depth" participation, and of the distrust of distant authority. The long hair, beards, nudity, tribal music, and chants against the "Establishment" seemed to fulfill McLuhan's prophecy. (Meyrowitz 3)

This theme echoed in the current literature about the development of a global CMC-based society. The decline of nationalism and the rise of tribalism are frequent themes.

As Ong repeatedly states in all his numerous works on medium theory, we were not aware of the effects that the visual orientation of print had on our thinking until that consciousness was altered by electronic media. McLuhan, writing before Ong and Havelock said the same things, pointed out that "the visual makes for the explicit, the uniform, and the sequential in painting, in poetry, in logic, in history." Meanwhile, he

contrasted pre-literate oral society as "implicit, simultaneous, and discontinuous." This oral orientation, he insisted, was returning in the "electronic present" (McLuhan, Gutenberg 57). As in oral society, where the solitude of the reader was unknown, the electronic present was leading a new generation to "experience everything at once," losing the separation and ordering of senses so common after Gutenberg.

McLuhan spoke of all forms of technology as extensions of man's normal abilities. The ladder was an extension of man's legs. The wheel barrow was an extension of his arms. The final phase, entering with the invention of the telegraph, was the extension of man's nervous system. McLuhan likened the laying of mile upon mile of telegraph wire to a giant nervous system with nerves expanding to all corners of the earth. He saw its effect as an equalizing force for the knowing and experiencing of all, for all. "Much as we have already extended our senses and our nerves by the various media," he wrote, "the technological simulation of consciousness [approaches], when the creative process of knowing will be collectively and corporately extended to the whole of human society" (McLuhan, Understanding 3).

The result was a prophetic belief that "electric speed in bringing all social and political functions together in a sudden implosion has heightened human awareness of responsibility to an intense degree...[others we meet through the media] can no longer be *contained* in the political sense of limited association. They are now *involved* in our lives, as we in theirs, thanks to the electric media" (McLuhan, Understanding 5). Shortly after those words appeared in print, America was watching on television the marches in Selma and Montgomery, demanding that civil rights progress accelerate; and watching carnage in

Viet Nam, with many viewers demanding the end to the war out of empathy for enemy victims. These events and many similar others were unprecedented in history. They likely brought basic change to American society. The process continues as e-mail from individuals half-way around the world bring individual experience in clear detail to the homes and offices of those in distant lands.

CHAPTER 3

THE ELECTRONIC NERVOUS SYSTEM SPANS THE GLOBE

Print made the exactly repeatable experience possible. It made it possible to send that experience around the world. The introduction of the telegraph made that process instantaneous. Whereas Roman and Native American runners and the Pony Express had been able to deliver messages across long distances in days or weeks, the telegraph could send a signal from New York to San Francisco at the speed of light. The message arrived instantly. A person in London could communicate with a person in Los Angeles faster than the woman next door could be heard shouting out her window. This was a communications shift of unimaginable proportion.

The importance of the telegraph did not escape Marshall McLuhan who likened it to an organic process. The outwardly spreading telegraph wires were, for McLuhan, the outerings of the human nervous system. It was man spreading his nerves across the land, taking in and sending information. The instantaneous conveyance of messages created a similarly lifelike electric organism, pulling mass communication away from the alienation of print and back toward an earthy connection with the human lifeworld. Whereas print had encouraged segmentation, the speed of the telegraph immersed society in cybernation, "an integrated system of information handling" (McLuhan, Understanding 218). The smashing of information monopolies based on the limitations of distance created an equalitarian effect. Delegated authority began to collapse as high authorities could

communicate with anyone and everyone in the organization no matter where their location. The pyramid and management structures common in pre-electronic times began to look antiquated and ineffective with many large organizations moving to flatten them. On the other hand, the power of orders coming directly from the highest authority encouraged them to be carried out uncritically.

While the effects of electronic media on print culture are well familiar to modern observers, some of the most radical social changes have been seen among pre-modern societies of developing nations who went directly from primal orality to electronic communication in the course of only a few years. Edmund Carpenter, an American anthropologist who spent much of his career living among pre-modern villagers, contrasted oral society with the new orality of electronics:

Tribal men everywhere regard themselves as an integral part of nature. They belong to a seamless web of kinship and responsibility. They merge the individual with the whole society. They're involved with life: they experience a *participation mystique*. This experience is one in which people are eager to merge with cosmic powers. . . Today we've entered a relatively dim, resonating tribal world in which the electronic extensions of everybody's nerves involve him deeply in all other lives. Where writing and print technology tore man out of the group, creating the great misery of psychic alienation, suddenly and without warning the electronic media hasten him back into the embrace of the group. Electricity binds the entire human community into a single tribe, with much resulting erosion of

individualism. (Carpenter and Heyman, work contains no page numbers)

Historian Daniel J. Boorstin saw the same effect when he noted, "The uniqueness of America would be its ability to erase uniqueness" (307). Electronic communication leveled time and place. Anything could happen at anytime at any place. For all of man's previous history, there had been the sense that what was happening "now" could never happen again. People, objects, and events were one of a kind. Either you were there to experience them when they happened, or you missed them all together. The only alternative was to hear the story of what happened from someone else, definitely an experience of a much inferior level. Electronic media erased that traditional dilemma. "When man could accomplish miracles he began to lose his sense of the miraculous. This meant the decline of common sense, and the irrelevance of the rules of thumb that had governed humans since the beginning of history. Attenuation summed up the new quality of experience" (Boorstin 305).

Although medium theorists have done considerable work to show how the electronic media is different from print, many of these social changes are obviously a continuation of the attack on orality that writing began and print accelerated. The replacement of the unique experience with the instantly repeatable experience moved society further and further from the natural evolutionary basis from which it arrived over thousands of years.

Walter Ong takes pains to point out that electronic media is not a pure return to orality, but instead, an orality based on print. In its own way, electronic media pushes man into further alienation from his biological past. "Living in the ambiance of [television's] nonpresent events has reorganized human consciousness, which is to say, the

individual's own sense of presence in and to himself and in the world around him" (Ong 316). Ong suggests that television's "open-system" quality has created a more open concern for the greater world. He relates the television era concern for ecology with this new open-system awareness.

The open-system message that television implicitly sends may jibe with man's psyche for this reason: a living organism constantly needs things outside itself for interaction in order to live. The very essence of life requires openness. Humankind's need to send his mind and thoughts beyond himself explains the innate attraction which television holds for us. If good fences no longer make good neighbors, television satisfies our most basic need by destroying fences.

Offering a national or international sense of occasion, media events pull millions of viewers toward a common agenda, understanding, or feeling. Television enfranchises. In a world of strangers, where masses have long replaced tiny medieval communities of familiar and like-minded faces, television appears to be the glue that bonds the millions in a somewhat common culture. In this sense, the broadcaster is the gate keeper to the national communal experience. Democracy requires visibility. In a mass democracy the individual opinion means nothing. When it is broadcast, understood and shared by others, the wheels of public opinion, the basis of democracy, start to turn. It would follow that mass media events are necessary for mass society to participate in a democracy--as necessary to democracy as media blackouts are for totalitarianism. The degree to which a nation's media enfranchise all groups shows the degree to which that society is open or closed. In American society, some groups, not seen as part of the mainstream, have

traditionally suffered little or no large-scale media coverage. Recently Candice Gingrich, the House Speaker's gay half-sister, has been a bonanza for those working for media coverage of lesbian rights issues.

Some of the strongest descriptions of television's impact on social change is told by those who have aimed the network television cameras. Robert J. Donovan and Ray Scherer, veterans of TV news, maintain that "when television news moved to the center of the political process in the 1950s, it changed that process from top to bottom." They continue:

Men walking on the moon. Scud missiles exploding in Israel. President Kennedy's coffin being loaded into a hearse at Andrews Air Force Base. The Berlin Wall crumbling. Police dogs and fire hoses terrorizing African Americans in Birmingham. . . . These scenes affected untold millions of television viewers. They even influenced public policy and political decisions. (Donovan and Scherer ix)

The change that television wrought on the course of social justice is clearly illustrated in a story recounted by network anchor John Chancellor. In 1955, he was one of the young reporters sent to Mississippi to cover the emerging civil rights struggle. Extremely unpopular with many locals, gangs of white thugs chased down reporters and destroyed their cameras. At one point, when Chancellor was using a tape recorder to interview blacks, he noticed white men in bib overalls closing in on him from behind. As a last resort he swung around and pointed the recorder at them and pretending it was a television camera exclaimed, "Come on. The whole world is going to know what you're

doing to me." The men took the ruse and backed off.

This typifies the media's effect on those doing wrong. Chancellor's "television camera" served the same purpose as the pamphlets and crude newspapers of the pre-Revolutionary era which precipitated the First Amendment as a tool for disarming scoundrels. Television simply relays the experience more clearly and directly than print can. This in spite of the romantic insistence by some that print, with all its unavoidable encoding and de-coding, is more capable of firing the imagination. This seems not to be the case when attempting to convey reality to the masses. As Arthur C. Clarke points out, "There is an immense psychological gulf between Real Time and Replay" (282). This he states in response to riveting coverage of the Gulf War, the first war to have been covered live on television. While print seems to require a certain psychological distance, a separation of the individual, television can be a remarkably natural educator-communicator as it is closer to the mother process of speech, sight and community. Dayan and Katz regard television's most important moments as those times when it celebrates central values of the society. "Great news events speak of accidents, of disruption, great ceremonial events celebrate order and its restoration" (Dayan and Katz 9). Many of television's most popular programs, 60 Minutes for example, depict this very process. A situation of disorder is shown, then restoration is achieved through the watch-dog barkings of the television producers followed by action on the part of agents of the state. In the end, a central value of society is celebrated.

But whose society is this that dominates the value-laden messages of the world's television broadcasts? Most certainly, it is that of the United States. In the 1990s, US

mass media materials account for 75% of broadcast and basic cable TV revenues and 85% of pay-TV revenues worldwide. Of theatrical film showings and home videos, 55% worldwide are US products. American CDs, records, and tapes amount to half of global revenues. The United States commands 35% of the book-sales market. In less developed nations, those with cultures typically more removed from that of western-oriented industrialized countries, the penetration of US television programs is often a great deal higher. Using Herbert Schiller's famous argument, cultural colonialism through television and movies is responsible for mass export of what Jacques Ellul has called "the American propaganda." American values, in all their complexity and manifestations, are insidiously beamed to all cultures everywhere. The result is often an erosion of other cultures as the world becomes progressively more like the Hollywood reality construct. This is Schiller's main point and one that has been immensely controversial over the past twenty-five years, but it is hard to imagine an opposite effect amid the universal saturation of American media.

Saskia Sassen's extensive study of the economics of global communication suggests that the process is centering financial and administrative power in a few communication centers. Noting that New York, London, and Tokyo have "undergone massive and *parallel* changes in their economic base, spatial organization, and social structure," he concludes that global communication has allowed top-level control and management of industry to become centered in these three locations (Sassen 4-5). With the advance of global communications, it is common for industrial production activities to be spread around the world. In the production of a product, management may come from the

United states with the production of parts taking place in Korea, and assembly of the product in Brazilian factories. Sassen maintains that this territorial dispersal creates a need for more centralized control and management.

The fundamental dynamic posited here is that the more globalized the economy becomes, the higher the agglomeration of central functions in a relatively few sites, that is, the global cities. The widely accepted notion that density and agglomeration will become obsolete because global telecommunications advances allow for maximum population and resource dispersal is poorly conceived. (Sassen 5)

In effect, the world becomes a global assembly line with the white collar managers residing in a few central cities. National borders serve to hinder any collectivization of workers in efforts to level the differences between manager and worker. The result is a world where the economic disparity between peoples widens. This effect of the further conquering of space and time and communication can hardly be a surprise to the communication scholar aware of history. The shift from oral communication to writing allowed for the expanded control of territory in ancient Egypt. Later, when writing on stone shifted to lighter, more easily carried materials, central administration was radically enlarged again, allowing creation of the massive Roman Empire. While better communication makes social injustice more visible, it also allows for increased centralized control. Computer communications make the transmission of financial information possible while television prepares the world's cultures for participation in the western design imposed by Sassen's global cities.

Some researchers have noted that media tend to conceptualize audiences in ways that are most economically advantageous. The production of programming that will appeal to

these perceived audiences tends, over time, to create actual audiences in the image of the program content. Steven Wildman's "one-way flows" in "the economics of audiencemaking" point out that big-budget blockbuster productions attract the largest audiences all over the world (Wildman 115). The television and movie programming produced in less affluent nations simply cannot compete with the western blockbusters for audience. Foreign producers, especially those not speaking English as a native language, have had very little success in cracking the American market. As a result, the world view portrayed by television is a decidedly American one. To the extent that television can foster a social reality, the supremacy of high-dollar Hollywood production is pulling world culture toward increased homogeneity.

At a time when traditional television is gaining world dominance, television itself, as a technology, is changing in ways that make it less capable of centralization. Described as a post-television culture, Peter D'Agostino and David Tafler believe that "television no longer means television...television come unhinged; it no longer stands alone as it did when the family gathered in front of the living room screen" (xiii). Television screens are everywhere, from supermarket ATMs to ballpark jumbotrons to CD-ROM equipped laptop computers. Television is multiplying in exponential ways, finding myriad new uses and weakening the central control of networks which once could claim total dominance over the living room TV, the only cathode ray tube in common life.

The liberation of the television camera from the television station has brought profound social effects in very few years. The existence of millions of inexpensive home video cameras clearly brought Rodney King and other incidents that precipitated decentralization. The

informal person-to-person passing of video tapes through the former Communist Block is said to have paved the way for mass protest and the ultimate implosion of communism. Guerrilla television producers are using the newly cheap means of production to show a television reality that is different from that emanating from traditional media organizations. Widely available time on communication satellites is making distribution of alternate media visions more feasible. The formerly dominant big three networks are now being challenged by a number of new networks taking somewhat different views. The rapid rise of Fox Broadcasting has given working-class and poor African Americans a presence, albeit a controversial one, on prime time network television. The proliferation of cable channels and communication satellites is leading toward the wide availability of much more alternative, low-budget television. While the blockbusters will always command the huge mass audiences, alternative and minority realities are becoming more and more available to anyone switching through the channels. As elites frantically attempt to construct legal and financial controls that will harness the power of television in all its manifestations, the technology spins into new uses and forms that seem to naturally thwart, at least for a while, the march of centralization.

Now, CMC is rapidly rising, not so much to challenge television, but to work with it hand-in-hand.

CHAPTER 4

GLOBAL ECONOMICS: LARGE-SCALE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CHANGE

“Market economy” and “democracy” are two words that always seem to be linked in the rhetoric of western leaders. A market economy is good, because it generally leads to democracy, we are often told. Economist Lester C. Thurow makes no mistake that the two are not handmadens, and to pretend that they are is no small slight of hand:

Democracy and capitalism have very different beliefs about the proper distribution of power. One believes in a completely equal distribution of political power, “one man, one vote,” while the other believes that it is the duty of the economically fit to drive the unfit out of business and into economic extinction. (Thurow 242)

Thurow believes that, put into its starkest form, capitalism is compatible with slavery, whereas democracy is not. This does not mean that markets and equality cannot exist on mostly happy terms. “Capitalism can adjust equally well to a completely egalitarian distribution of purchasing power” (Thurow 242). Under capitalism, income can be rather evenly distributed, or all the wealth can be shuttled to a single individual or group while the rest stand and watch. The later seems to be the direction of the market today. One percent of the population controls 40% of the wealth. Should this be a surprise? When one looks at the basic process of the market, where one harnesses the work of another, paying that person less than what the work brings; it is obvious that

capitalism is inherently opposed to equality. Only when democracy puts its force behind curbing the extremes of the market can anything like economic equality be achieved. As computer scientist Dertouzos insisted earlier, the market cannot be left to its own devices.

Thurow seconds this notion:

Capitalistic economies are essentially like Alice in Wonderland, where one must run very fast to stand still--just stopping inequality from growing requires constant effort. Historically, since market economies haven't produced enough economic equality to be compatible with democracy, all democracies have found it necessary to "interfere" in the market with a wide variety of programs that are designed to promote equality and stop inequality from rising. (245)

The well-known socio/political theories of Rawls, Walzer, and Nozick are predicated on the existence of a strong national government embracing some form of democracy. In today's world that "given" is getting harder to expect. Thurow believes that the demise of competing political systems in most countries around the world has left democracy with little pressure to assert its beliefs. It has become weaker, allowing the balance to tip in the direction of unfettered market economy (or "friction-less capitalism" as Bill Gates likes to call it). The "simultaneous existence of the two different power systems has never been tested during a time when rapidly rising economic inequalities were widely known and government was determined to do nothing about them. The test is now under way."

(Thurow 246)

Thurow believes that this creates a significant problem for equality in the form of

democracy. As the gap between rich and poor widens with the middle growing smaller, democratic states will struggle mightily with the unequal socioeconomic structure left behind. Meanwhile, mainstream rhetoric is oblivious to any need to turn the tide, virtually acting as a propaganda machine for rather extreme forms of market economy. A recent USA Today article chided Europeans for their long-held position against a run-away market:

Analysts say the European marketplace remains highly inefficient compared to the USA. European workers zealously guard their lifetime tenure, generous benefits and six-week holidays. Business crawls during August, when the Continent shuts down for summer vacations. Some analysts question whether Europeans can put aside their distaste for unfettered American capitalism and finally get their act together. (Valdmanis 2B)

For the voice of USA Today, the European unwillingness to give all to the market is a moral defect that should be cured with a healthy dose of discipline. This is not an idiosyncrasy of an individual writer, but a common position held by a great mass of Americans. The market takes on a quality of manifest destiny backed by a moral imperative to dedicate all to the market regardless of the price to individuals. When viewed against the backdrop of economic theory like that of Thurow, American ideology appears to be little more than propaganda successfully perpetrated by a small privileged class over a massive subservient class. In an age when democracy is backing away from economic regulation, capital has been freed from the restraints of borders, and computer-

mediated communication makes national borders irrelevant; it would seem that a need is building for a renewed ideology and a way to enforce it that will avert the disaster Thurow and others see. And lest we be swayed by the optimism characteristic of Bill Gates, Thurow reminds us that “maybe survival-of-the-fittest capitalism can be made to work, but no one has done so yet” (250). Technology may augment our civilization in wonderful ways, but it is unlikely to wipe clean the past experiences of class and economics. The old rules are probably still in effect.

The term "Global Economics" is bantered about these days with the air of something that is trendy and new. Certainly, the level and type of global economy that the world experiences today is new. The size and scope of the Western-style market economy that is sweeping the earth, including many areas which until recently rejected capitalism in any substantial form, has a power and reach unknown even in modern times. As global market economy rapidly advances, it carries with it fundamental changes in societies, cultures, and political structures. It is worthwhile to search for the broad sweep of global economy, seeking to discern major patterns, causes, and futures. We will look at the nature and logic of market capitalism and the relationships and dynamics that develop between global players.

Certainly, global economy is not new. With each surge of new technology, the ability to coordinate and carry out trade in far flung places has advanced with it. The invention of writing in ancient times allowed Middle-Eastern societies to expand their reach to distant lands. Ultimately, the associated transfer of knowledge led to the great treasures of Greek intellectual culture.

The next great advancement in Western culture again came on the heels of a leap in technology and an accompanying surge in foreign trade. The Italian Renaissance brought vast amounts of capital to cities through the development of trade routes to the near East and the development of dramatically more efficient ships and shipping. While we remember the Italian Renaissance for its resurgence of Greek philosophy, its great works of art, and its contributions to literature and science, the wildly successful economy of the day put incredible strains on existing social and political systems. It is no exaggeration to say that Italy was in a state of violent anarchy. Great wealth, fabulous art and thought, and wide-spread murder all co-existed in close proximity.

As we will see further along in this paper, the characteristics and forces in past surges of world trade are still in effect today.

Steam power and mechanization are credited with the phenomenal success of the English industrial revolution. It is also important to note that the revolution would have been impossible without the availability of distant resources and markets made possible by the mighty transport and communications provided by English shipping. The period produced the two giants of classical economic theory: Adam Smith and Karl Marx. In simplest form, Smith showed the power of steam-powered mechanization in his famous pin factory; Marx showed the changes in social and political structures that resulted.

By the 19th century, steam ship routes crisscrossed the oceans of the world. The power of global transport and communication improved so dramatically that when author Robert Louis Stevenson grew too ill to live in London, he continued to thrive as a major literary figure while living the rest of his life on an island in the South Pacific, a stop on the

steam ship route to Europe.

During the same period, Europe maintained a world-wide network of colonial outposts in what is now known as the developing world. Raw materials and labor were harvested from distant countries to provide for the factories of Europe. The thought of the time explained that Europeans profited and raised their standard of living while colonial influence bettered the lives of primitives. Certainly the influence of British colonialism is apparent in the thriving business establishments of Hong Kong, India, and locations in Africa. The effects of French involvement are still seen in South East Asia, Africa, and the Caribbean. From this period came the global economic theory of Modernization. It holds that non-Western countries are being helped through trade to become more modern (or more like the West). While this theory is no longer of great validity among economists, it is still the guiding paradigm in business.

More recently, Spanish-speaking economists in Santiago developed the theory of Dependency Economics. Dependency theories, while having their inspiration in the work of Marx, began in the 1960s and quickly became the pervasive thought on the causes of underdevelopment. Dependency economics argues that colonialism started a master and slave relationship between early developing countries and the rest of the world. The often used model is one of center countries (developed nations) supporting their high standard of living through the exploitation of peripheral countries. (underdeveloped nations). Latin American economists have noted that their countries have a dependent relationship that deepens and aggravates the fundamental problems of their peoples. Trade relations based on monopolistic control of the market and transfer of surplus production to dominant

countries. Financial relations encourage loans that further dependency. As a result, the dependent country must generate large surpluses through super-exploited human power and not through technological advances. The combination of these inequalities and the transfer of raw resources from the most backward and dependent countries to the most advanced and dominant ones explains the inequality, deepens it, and transforms this dependency into a necessary structural element of the world economy.

It is important to note that some enlightened business captains do not regard the harsh warnings of dependency theorists as anti-business. The disequilibrium that dependency creates fuels worker dissatisfaction in peripheral nations. Behind the headlines of staggering economic growth and profits generated in places like Malaysia and Singapore are journalistic reports of suppressed workers performing under extremely high levels of frustration and resentment. Intelligent business people understand that the destruction of societies in the name of advancing business will soon leave businesses in an unsavory world where profitable activities are no longer possible. Economist Herman E. Daly has shown that when the dependency aspects of Western business operations are taken into consideration, businesses are deep in the red. Daly, at first ignored, now respected, documented ways in which capitalism took unaccounted for tolls from populations and the environment. When those extractions of resources, both natural and human, were taken into account, business was shown to be living high on borrowed advantage. Sooner or later, some captains of industry reason, the world and its populations will no longer be able to provide business with a free ride and the comparatively high-income standard of living the West has enjoyed will slow to a halt.

It is important to note that this is advanced dependency economics, now out of the hands of social economists and into the board rooms of multi-national corporations. Hiroyuki Yoshikawa, a respected professor of engineering at Tokyo University, has proposed a new kind of factory that takes the dependency view into account. Japanese industry, also future thinking and aware of social consequences, is apparently listening. Yoshikawa and others in Japan feel that companies will survive in the future but the outlook is not so good for the people who work for them or live around them. Industry is still leaning on the now dated developments of the steam-powered industrial revolution. It is an asset-wasting design that the world can no longer afford. The 16th century environment of John Locke, the ideological guide for capitalism, is gone forever. The world is no longer filled with a plethora of "un-held things." Every thing and every worker is "held" by someone or something. For every thing that is taken, a price is explicitly or implicitly paid.

Yoshikawa has envisioned an inverse factory to compliment the existing factory. As he explains, "It is not an open pass-through system, but a closed loop. The waste material should be recovered and input into some new type of factory that translates waste into new materials. We will have a plus factory and a minus factory--a normal factory and an inverse factory" (Greider 450).

CHAPTER 5

HEILBRONER AND THE NATURE OF CAPITALISM

Much of the current condition in world economics has been explained, even predicted by economist Robert Heilbroner. The key lies in the nature and logic of capitalism itself. One must look to the side-by-side beginnings of modern science and modern capitalism several centuries ago. European world outlook shifted, in essence, to replace religion with science to create a view that allowed for exploitation of environment. Heilbroner believes that capitalism would be impossible in a world where men and women relate to their environment with awe and veneration. Capitalism requires that one believe that nature is indifferent to the operations performed on it by humans. This point is not exclusive to capitalism, but also embodied at the foundation of the scientific outlook.

This commoditization of nature is also extended to include humans themselves. Responsibility for the exploitation of humans is shifted to the market mechanism. The serf is exploited, not by the capitalist, but by the invisible hand. Exploitation, according to Heilbroner, becomes invisible when the serf's diverted output is carried out by the market's invisible hand. Thus, there is a difference in the interpersonal attitudes existing in market societies and non-market societies. For Heilbroner, capitalism serves to reduce human contact in order to "minimize the emotional entanglements that might interfere with the necessary stance of interpersonal" acquisition (Heilbroner 59). Heilbroner summarizes:

The expansion of capital is aided and abetted by the declaration that

moral and aesthetic criteria--the only dikes that might hold back the floodtide of capital's expansion--are without relevance within the realm of economic activity. (118)

Of course, all this makes a rather harsh case against the traditions and ideologies of the business world. From the theories presented thus far, it might appear that capitalism leverages the advantage of a privileged group by setting aside considerations for the equitable treatment of environment and humans. This simple act of declaring all within the commercial realm "free game" gives capitalism a mighty leverage, the advantage needed to produce growth and profit.

CHAPTER 6

THE STRUCTURE OF MARKETS

Let us look at the market economy process again. I make a profit by selling an item for more than I paid for it. The reasoning, from a theoretical level, is that I mixed my work with it and am therefore entitled to payment for my work which I realize in the form of profit. If I can find other ways to increase my profit, all the better. I must draw the line and exclude profitable advantages when they appear immoral (or illegal, which we could argue comes from the same root). How can I get around a strict moral interpretation which might prohibit me from making any profit (as with the strict exclusion of trade during earlier centuries when any handling of money was considered a threat against society)? I can shift my morality to allow for a healthy amount of leveraged advantage in order to make an acceptable amount of profit. For instance, I can, as we do in the United States, focus on the importance of individual success, disregarding to a higher extent the welfare of the group.

This thought process gets at what Heilbroner is saying. It also illustrates the root concern in the debates of business ethics, proper development of global market economy, the creation of laws, and the guidance of boardroom activities. The debate of what is proper, what is improper, what can be justified by a proper shifting of generally accepted ideology--all are the daily conversation of attorneys and corporate strategists.

Unfortunately, many MBA programs lack this approach to business and economics.

To view the development and current nature of capitalism from this austere light is considered anti-business and inappropriate for the mood of the business classroom. However, this writer would suggest that without looking without bias at the fundamental nature and logic of capitalism and markets, it is impossible to do any more than recite group-accepted mantras about business. No true understanding of economic forces can take place. Without true understanding, current economic phenomena cannot be understood. Perhaps even more important, it is doubtful that accurate predictions can be made about the economic future.

Markets are, by most economists' estimation, one of humankind's most impressive inventions. So smoothly does it work in comparison with other forms of economic management that it takes on the air of a natural force. It is remarkably like Smith's "invisible hand," a social force that, for Smith, is very close to something invented by God himself. It is important to remember that market economies are not an act of nature. They are a rather recent invention in the history of humans. More ancient or traditional economics systems were based on traditions of distribution, sharing, and need. In the traditional system, shortage does not necessarily drive up the value of goods until only those with great resources may own them. Instead, limited resources are shared rather equally until they are gone. Likewise, resources in great abundance are not rapidly gathered by those who can, as they are in a market economy. The object is not to create great individual wealth, but to spread abundance throughout the group in order to improve the lot of all. Thus, the clucking tongues are heard in American towns situated near Native American reservations when, after one member of the reservation has profited

admirably, all members of the tribe ride into town to "blow" the new found wealth of their fellow. Good fortune is not for the individual to leverage for more good fortune, but to distribute equitably throughout the group.

Let us keep in mind the differences between modern market economy and the traditional economy as we look at the structure of global economics. This difference in how goods and services are distributed permeates all dynamics and, certainly, all controversies.

The market's most important function is to create a balance between supply and demand. When demand is high, the resources necessary to deliver the product or service will appear and get the supply to the consumer. When supply exceeds demand, consumers will get their fill with less trouble and cost. In theory, at least, the consumer is aided by competition between producers. The contest for best product at the lowest price succeeds in giving the consumer the best of all worlds, while supplying the producer with the opportunity to succeed mightily.

While the market economy has a great many shortcomings--not everyone enjoys the same quality of life--its advantages over other economic systems has been demonstrated again and again in recent decades. Under the socialist system of the former Soviet Union, consumers stood in long lines for products that sat in warehouses or rotted in the fields. In many of the world's totalitarian systems goods and services are routed to the ruling class with no chance for distribution among other classes. Only in a free market economy, where people have basic guarantees of equity, can the distribution of goods and services reach a smooth equilibrium of balanced price, quality, and ease of availability. The

market's greatest asset is efficiency. (Again, it is important to note that this is how the free market economy operates in theory, and not the uneven reality that most are aware of today.)

There are several factors which cause the market system to fail. In many ways, the great boom in markets as the predominant economic system around the world has to do with the current ability to overcome these factors of failure.

The first is ignorance. The functioning market economy requires participants who have detailed knowledge of what is happening within the market. Changes in prices, supplies, and distribution patterns are of prime importance to the market participant. It is interesting to note that the first form of electric communication was not the telegraph, but a series of semaphores in France that functioned to get news of stock market changes to participants outside Paris. In a market economy, information is power. Today information flows freely from anywhere in the world to anywhere else in the world. A manager can control a plant in Mexico from Mexico City, New York, or Hong Kong, all with the same speed and ease. Satellite, phone, fax, Internet, and the growing system of aircraft have made largely irrelevant place, space, and time. Throughout history, these factors of spacial and temporal situation determined the distribution of goods, power, and prestige. In recent decades old balances have been toppled providing for a wild scramble for the restructuring of wealth, power, and business influence.

Journalist William Greider has noted that the recent deregulation of the flow of capital between nations has been the prime fuel behind the rather recent explosion of global trade. Staggering amounts of money flies at fantastic speeds from one country to

the next and back around the globe in the course of a single day. The realm of capital is unfettered by time and place, more so than any time even in recent history.

The great challenges of today remind one of the troubles encountered by Italian society during the Renaissance. The dramatic increase in trade and profits has created a business environment that is far ahead of the social and political structures it operates within. Today's global traders and manufacturers are hampered by regulation and corruption in host countries. Places like Malaysia, peppered with high-rise office buildings and computer-controlled factories funded by huge amounts of Western capital, still require companies to make sizable payments to local officials.

Other countries, like Japan, refuse to let the effects of free market economy interfere with social successes already in place. The currently proposed opening of Japan's economy is interpreted in the West as the long awaited relaxation of import prohibitions. We are told that if the economy is opened, Japanese will enjoy a greater variety of products (read: foreign made) at lower prices. All in Japan will benefit. However, this ignores the logic of Japan's traditional (and very successful) system of full employment. Prices are higher and trade is limited in Japan so that Japanese companies can afford to employ a great many people with a very high level of job security. Japanese companies can afford to provide everyone with a stable job because the market is controlled: prices are kept high while foreign competition is kept out.

In many ways, the current debate in Japan exemplifies the debate going on in market-economy countries all over the world. It gets to the heart of the benefits and drawbacks of free market economies operating within a global setting. Perhaps it is most

notable because the Japanese debate is going on within one of the world's great economic powers. The same concerns also exist in the many developing or Third World nations which form necessary partners in global economy and the past and continued successes of the industrial powers.

CHAPTER 7

IMPORTANCE OF THE THIRD WORLD PERSPECTIVE

What was once called the Third World is now denoted by a number of other names: the developing world, underdeveloped nations, pre-industrial societies, and, in some economic circles, the periphery. A number of countries which have been seen as developing in the past are now regarded by many in business as highly developed, even though their high level of development can be seen only in some cities or in some parts of cities and not in the country as a whole. For the purposes of this paper, we will refer to all countries outside the industrial West as Third World. It is not meant to be a definitive judgment on the economic status of these countries, but as a convenient operational definition from which to proceed in discussion.

It is important that we look at global economic factors from the perspective of Third World societies for several reasons.

The high level of interconnectivity in the world today demands that the perspectives of all be considered. The 19th-century practice of ignoring the Third World perspective, or reinterpreting it from a Western standpoint, was possible only because of the vast stretches of space and time which separated developed lands from the undeveloped. The effects of extracting cheap resources and labor was not considered by developed governments or reported in their newspapers. When colonial officials forced political, social, educational, and economic reforms on distant societies, there was no CNN to

record the effects, changes, and, in many cases, protests. There was little interconnectivity in the world and only a very small chance that changes in one distant land would reverberate through international agreements, reciprocal packs, power balances, and supply sources as it would today. As we enter the 21st century, disruptions in one part of the world will likely be felt rather immediately in many other parts of the world. When Rwanda erupted in ethnic conflict, coffee prices soared in American supermarkets. The disruption of production from Rwandan coffee plantations was felt by otherwise unconcerned workers everywhere.

More and more, large corporations think of their proper market as the entire globe. It is often said in economics that a firm first thinks of itself as domestic, then domestic with a limited important market, then as a firm highly involved in imports, then as a domestic firm with international plants or offices, and finally as an international firm with little more than historical ties to its original domestic country. In this international environment, it is no longer possible to claim isolation. The American automobile manufacturer operating a plant in Brazil and selling trucks in Asia is as much an Asian or Brazilian firm as it is an American multi-national. The toll taken from and the benefits given to these foreign societies through the dynamics of global economy are of concern not just from an American point-of-view, but from a global perspective where the majority of an American firm's employees and market may be of another nationality. The world's concerns are the American company's concerns. For the CEO possessing wisdom, the American firm operating in Africa must do so without creating hardship for that African society. To do otherwise is to gradually spoil the peoples and environment, to corrupt the

field of play, to shorten the life span of the market, and to frustrate long-term investments.

While these could be considered ethical reasons, they are also practical concerns. Ethics exist to preserve or create a society of maximum usefulness. Ethical concerns have their roots and products in concrete benefits. The business person engaging in ethical practices is not just doing so to appease a religion, or for PR purposes, or even to be "nice guys." He or she is using ethics as a safeguard against the well-documented ills that accompany the robust use of capital, for a global market economy presents many problems as well as solutions.

Perhaps French thinker and policy expert Attali holds the most daunting reason why centers of finance and control in the global market economy should be vitally concerned with the Third World perspective. If cities in Africa, South America, Asia, and elsewhere continue to explode in population, fail to address billions living in squalor and political oppression, while the environment is ravaged and polluted; then the global economy's meteoric success will only be a brief and deceptive prelude to a doomsday eventuality for which none of us wish. We must not delude ourselves into thinking that we can gain a marvelous standard of living and mightily swell the coffers of global corporations while being blind to the tolls extracted from Third World societies. The globe that we build may not be the one we want. It may not even be one in which we can live.

CHAPTER 8

APPLICATION OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY TO ISSUES OF
FAIRNESS AND EQUALITY IN GLOBAL MARKET CAPITALISM

In America, as well as in other countries, the capitalist system is supported by a kind of Platonic "noble lie." For the majority of citizens to contribute to a market structure that benefits a dominant class, there must be an accepted myth that such a system benefits all. At least for white Americans, the early experience of rapid economic growth won the faith of the masses. The experience was adopted into the common myth and shared belief of American culture. Heilbroner notes that America has experienced a "unique failure to develop an anticapitalist political consciousness." Experiencing instead "a widening stream of mass consumption goods that soon took on the powerful psychological appeal of prestige goods" (168).

This belief interacts with the market-abetting role of the state in an "elaborate pretense of a private realm operating without any--or with only a minimal--support from the state, and of a state only marginally responsible for the successful operation of the economic sphere" (Heilbroner 103).

Heilbroner's analysis of the American system is important for our study, as it is mostly the tradition of American-style capitalism that is driving the development of global markets. American philosophers--such as Rawls, Walzer, and Nozick--seem to develop their theories from the actual workings of various aspects of the American system.

Nozick's libertarianism is reminiscent of the minimal state that American capital argues for and is currently working to defend in the development of global economy. When Nozick argues against having to contribute one's time, work, or money toward a socially determined demand, he is describing a world agreeable to the needs of market capitalism. Rawls sees the state based on justice, a state suspiciously like the United States (a point brought up by many of his detractors). Walzer is concerned with a state-initiated distributive justice, not only similar to traditional practices in the United States, but to the equal representation found in German industrialism. These loose comparisons by no means carry the essence of these philosophers' theories. The point is merely to recognize that they generate from an American perspective that is more easily understood when seen in the light of Heilbroner. Again, when global development is largely under the influence of American capital, American media, and CMC (which is still dominated by this country); American philosophy applies to a significant extent even when discussing development of foreign societies. At present, the logic and structure of development under a capitalist lead demands a fair amount of American ideology which comes attached as a condition of participation.

The major ideologies of political philosophy provide a framework for understanding the state, power, capitalism, fairness, and justice questions confronting developing global economy. Beyond some pervasive spread of an ethical myth embraced by all, it would normally be up to states to gain basic rights and benefits for the common man and woman. While current market forces would appear to be a powerful force of nature, business cannot be a force of nature. Business is a construction of human culture. Its laws are not

nature's but social and legal processes historically generated and changeable. To maintain or change social and legal processes is the purpose of government. If government is incapable of dealing effectively with modern capitalism, then a new, better adapted, form of government is in order. Still, we could argue that market forces are, in large part, the product of human nature and to change them would require a Herculean effort.

Whereas Walzer, Rawls, and Nozick were writing in a time when rapidly strengthening national governments were prominent, today's steamrolling global economies are largely outside the power of states. This is particularly true in regard to the ability of CMC to operate beyond the control of national boundaries. When a deregulated, borderless capital combines with CMC (which seems to be incapable of being bordered), the result is a powerful force clearly beyond the control of current political systems. The need now seems to be for a different kind of state, one that has power to foster ethics and limits on a borderless capital even though the very nature of capital defies such requirements. Capital seeks to throw off limits.

If there is a solution that will come into common usage, it will not likely appear as something entirely new. The design of this new government and the answers to these questions will no doubt come from the long experiences of major ideologies. They could hardly come from anywhere else in the reality of practical government. A successful ideology requires broad, popular support. The hearts of the masses invariably look to their roots in past ideologies when constructing something "new."

It is only natural to first look to anarchism. Journalist Greider frequently accentuates the great role that anarchy plays in the current global system. While he is not technically

referring to anarchy as a philosophical ideology, the mere occurrence of a situation that can be called anarchic begs for a closer look under the framework of the common beliefs of anarchism. Richard Sylvan's assertion: "anarchism is to political authority as atheism is to religious authority," successfully describes the way market capital operates indifferently, largely outside the jurisdiction of nations (216). The global market economy runs without a "head" or centralized control. Those involved in the system recently escaped the dominance of the state (through technology and deregulation of rules limiting international financial transactions) and do not wish to return to centralized authority. All these are key characteristics that Sylvan attributes to anarchism.

But, as Sylvan points out, a complete lack of control is not what anarchism is all about:

Anarchism thus implies decentralization, but in a precise sense. Eliminating the centre does not thereby also remove all structure. It leaves available the possibility of a rich variety of structures, including network arrangements with no centres or with multiple centres. (Sylvan 219)

Indeed, Sylvan is concerned with anarchism as applied to political systems and not economics. Yet, in a world where political systems are effectively absorbed by capital, the lines between political and economic blur.

It is as if Sylvan is constructing the possibilities for anarchism while observing the structures of modern corporations where a staunch move to decentralization has been the manager's battle cry for the last twenty years. First with the Japanese, then in America, large companies found that many centers was preferable to one center. Top down

managerial design became anathema (although it is still practiced in many companies). Employees are directed by team consensus. Rather than receiving directions from a centralized head, the team develops its own directions under the general guidelines handed down from one of many centers in the company. This would seem to fit the general requirements of an anarchic society governed by a minimal state, which is what Sylvan seems to be inferring and Nozick suggests directly in their discussions of anarchy-like societies.

The point that should be taken here is that anarchism has worked very successfully for business in the age of computer communication. Given that the world is now in the grips of a global market economy with business values from which there is no imminent escape, it would seem that an emerging global governing structure would naturally follow the concepts of anarchism, or Nozick's minimal state. If what we are seeing now is a long term victory for capitalism--with Marxism and its various offspring in remission--there may be no other or better direction for those that would limit capitalism (including many capitalists!) to build some kind of globally effective state.

The one great contradiction here is that the current anarchic system works like no other in history to funnel vast sums of money into the dominant class. It is anarchism for the captains of capital. Sylvan says this cannot be the case for anarchism, for he maintains that the common cry of anarchists is states must be abolished as "states are devices for channeling privilege" (222). If national governments can be accused of aiding and abetting the staggering growth of market capitalists, the system of the capitalists channels privilege purely, directly, and unfettered by regulation. For the captain of capital, his anarchism is a

privilege channeling machine, pure and simple, and the more successful the better.

Historically, anarchism has been radically equalitarian. It has operated further to the left than Marxism. Perhaps what we really have in the enlightened management of corporations and capital is an educated elite that has found that the best efficiency can be had after a gesture of equalitarian anarchism to workers. No one ever said that the reality of the market would neatly conform to ideological lines.

This situation immediately gives rise to those who would cry for the dismantling of the global economy, a new kind of anarchist who will not accept the centralized control that a few hundred financial planners scattered around the world have on his life. The definition of "state" begins to shift. Are Washington DC and London--which are now largely powerless to control the direction of global development, their central banks unable to match and control the vast masses of capital on the market system--less of a centralized authority than market capital?

George Soros, the New York bond trader who has made billions by forcing government currency regulators around the world into embarrassing situations, fears that, for all his profit from the situation, the world is headed for a crash. "I cannot see the global system surviving," he wrote recently. "Political instability and financial instability are going to feed off each other in self-reinforcing fashion. In my opinion, we have entered a period of global disintegration only we are not yet aware of it" (Greider 248).

Before trying to save the world by making a counter leap back to some kind of socialist state, arguably the intuitive response for many, it would be good to consider conservatism. It is hard to find a true conservative. Business people who declare

themselves "conservative" are far from that in the ways they are creating an economic system of vast power much different from anything found historically. In fact, Anthony Quinton's statement that conservatism insists on "the maintenance of existing institutions and practices and is suspicious of change, particularly of large and sudden change, and above all of violent and systematic revolutionary change" would indicate that the conservative is repulsed by the current state of global economy (244-245). The conservative response might be very similar to that of Edmund Burke who wrote in regard to the French Revolution, that a great culture was foolishly throwing away all that it had gained over centuries. The conservative reveres humankind's organic connections, rejecting the abstract and theoretical which stray too far from how men have always been. Perhaps this perspective gets to the root of what is so disturbing to so many about the advance of market economy. What could be further from man's ancient history and tradition than being controlled by an unseen elite from afar who virtually force one to manufacture products for export, products not affordable on the local worker's salary and ill suited to the worker's local culture.

On the other hand, this alienation of the worker is Marx almost to the letter. The expanding global market economy attempts to reduce all people and things to commodities, to economic value. Values not supported by capital are brushed aside. The situation, if continued, could prove explosive. That is exactly what journalist Greider fears: that oppressed workers everywhere will rise up in a violent move to overthrow the reign of capital. This is happening as the disparity between wages of rich, poor, and middle reach levels not seen since the 19th century. Rather than expecting the final

victory of the proletariat and resulting nirvana, Greider fears violence, bloodshed, and increased misery without a happy resolution. This is already happening in places in the East where collective representation is prohibited, yet defiant workers risk death to found futile attempts at establishing rights and equality. As Barry Hindess notes, Marxism becomes possible when individuals recognize themselves as a class (314). The defiant acts of rightless workers under brutal regimes may be an indicator of those attempting to establish or express a class consciousness.

Those who comment on Marx often seem to neglect the fact that he did not create his theories in the comfort of modern academe or industry. He and many of those around him lived desperate lives. His work is infused with a kind of passionate activism. It may be the *spirit* of Marx, not the details of his ideology, which underclass masses will find appealing. Marxism may have a second day, larger than the first, at the next turn. Announcements that Marxism died with the Soviet Union may be premature. Its themes of elite and oppressed give it the sort of general populist appeal that Christianity has made use of in myriad lands and cultures for centuries. The theme is useful, adaptable, and may well continue to be a thorn in the side of unrestrained capitalism. A better developed Marxism, suffering less from overly simplistic concepts, could rise to give the market the competition it needs, the competition that Thurow believes is necessary for capital to remain beneficial to humanity and not run amok in excesses of efficiency.

While Marxism may inspire opposition to capital, it will likely be socialism that inhabits the structure of a move to restrain the negative effects of global market economy. A limited socialism is already in place in America, with a more complete socialism in

Europe and in Japan where law and tradition require business to take a greater role in providing for those at the bottom. It should be noted that the belief by some that America has socialism for the rich has been validated by recent actions of Congress. We are currently seeing the reduction of programs for the poor while the lion's share of social funding remains untouched in programs traditionally enjoyed by the middle and upper classes.

As Peter Self writes, "socialism grew up in opposition to capitalism" (333). It offers the moral and ethical element that capitalism rejects. It is also an "experienced" ideology with tested ideas on how to counter the neglecting of equality. This central regard for equality, according to Self, is the most important factor in differentiating socialism from the other ideologies:

The belief in 'equal moral worth', 'equal moral capacity' and consequently 'equal entitlement to consideration' is not, of course, confined to socialists. The difference is that socialists take its implications seriously. Conservatives accept a hierarchical order of privilege or talent. Liberals accept the gross inequalities of the market system. Socialism is nothing if it does not struggle to carry the implications of 'equal worth' into the social and economic realms.

(Self 338)

Perhaps a testament to the importance of language, the term "worth" has multiple shades of meaning in English, the language of market capital. It is an easy jump from "worth" in a moral sense to "worth" in an economic sense. Monetary price can be put on the wages and costs of maintaining a worker. It is a recent, revolutionary, and, for many,

troubling thought of using accounting to assign worth to the moral and emotional lives of people, their cultures, and the earthly environment they live in. On these terms, business--all business--is a monetarily losing proposition. The books are deeply in the red when "worth" for the capitalist is defined with a more inclusive meaning. However, this is an idea that many progressive capitalists are beginning to embrace. To consider products, factories, and labor as "worth," and ignore the worth of other human and environmental factors hints of a structurally ingrained exploitation. There is a growing collective realization that if market economy is going to gain through exploitation, it must at least do so wisely. The alternative is the likely collapse of burdened environments and societies. Not only is that a difficult alternative on moral terms, but it robs the capitalist of his field of play. But wait a minute. How can moral considerations be thrust upon the captains of capital whose discipline requires the pursuit of efficiency gained through exclusion of morals? Although it may seem against the nature of all past experience, it is increasingly in the interest of capital to become more compassionate, more caring about human and physical resources, understanding that continued abuse is not efficient use of leverage, but the destruction of the environment necessary for future profits. Markets have traditionally been geared toward the short term. However, when faced with change or extinction, as may become the case in the not-too-distant future, a more long-term perspective may evolve for the very same reasons that short-term approaches made sense in earlier times.

Self notes that socialists look forward to a post-materialist society, one that "looks back as well as forward," one in which the "accumulation of possessions counts for less and the cultivation of personal capacities and of community life for a great deal more"

(347). He believes the challenge of this vision will be to "ensure that the costs of limiting economic growth are equitably shared, that priority is given to basic material needs, and that the opportunities of a post-material society are widely shared and not confined to the tastes of middle-class radicals" (Self 347). One might add, in America, that it not be confined to the tastes of middle-class conservatives, or even to the tastes of the majority.

As touched on above, language defines ideas. The terms used in a discussion are important to the meaning and direction of that discussion. The terms of the debate over equality, fairness, and justice in the global market system are the terms of liberalism. Our commonly held ideas on such issues stem from classical liberalism. As Alan Ryan notes, classical liberalism is associated with such pillars of democracy and business as John Locke, Adam Smith, and Alexis de Tocqueville. "It focuses on the idea of limited government, the maintenance of the rule of law, the avoidance of arbitrary and discretionary power, and the sanctity of private property and freely made contracts, and the responsibility of individuals for their own fates" (Ryan 293). It could be noted that these ideas do not fare well in the contemporary context. Some would say because of the decline in the force of moral considerations.

These are precisely the issues that trouble journalist Greider when observing market capital at work in countries around the world. He sees an absence of these classic liberal values. Capital is fleeing countries that embrace liberal values to go to work in countries where economic advantage is gained by resisting those values. In a world where global capital is king, the new advantage of non-liberal countries puts a deleterious force on those countries that traditionally embrace classical liberalism. Economic forces pressure

them to become less liberal. Interestingly, Greider's pragmatic solution is to stipulate classical liberal ideals in trade agreements. In his view, the only effective means of reversing the anti-liberal trend is to force other countries to comply.

To some extent this is already occurring. The United States insists that China cease authoritarian practices. This is generally ineffective. China sees no need to embrace liberal norms largely alien to their tradition. We may never succeed in getting China to believe the "noble lie" of capitalism. This leads to a larger question. Can some kind of global government ever exist when large segments of political control cannot embrace core beliefs? Is not central belief as important in the cohesion of a global world in the same way it is in a nation? Perhaps this describes the limit of capital as a factor of unification. But as commoditization searches for new markets, as it is trying very hard to do in mainland China, we may see the encroachment of the market on places that now seem beyond its reach.

Ryan brings up an even more basic problem. It is quite possible that "modern liberalism makes everyone an unrealizable promise of a degree of personal fulfillment that the welfare state cannot deliver, and that its efforts to deliver will inevitably frustrate" (Ryan 295). We see this every day in our American newspapers. The push and tug over equality and fairness seems not to be able to strike a satisfactory balance for all. Benefits to some always seem to mean less for others. Back and forth the consideration goes, seemingly never to strike a lasting balance. There is no reason to believe that it will work any less problematically for a global society.

One of the problems, especially in American society, is the perception that some

deserve a share while others do not. While “ownership” is generally a legal, physical distinction; “deserving” is mostly a moral one. For most Americans, the moral distinction is tied up in a very strong concept of the individual as an autonomous agent. This leads to a great degree of difference between what two people deserve. One is usually considered to deserve a share because of what he or she did and not because of an environment in which they were placed. The American belief system largely disregards the social origins and significance of poverty. Sociologist Wilson Julius Wilson has observed that “social citizenship rights in the United States are less developed and less intertwined with rights of political and civil citizenship” (155). His definition of social citizenship regards the ability of individuals to hold a basic quality of life. In a society where social citizenship is not observed, anti-poverty programs can be cut or dropped without any damage to its body of rights. This would be a much more difficult proposition in many European nations.

Rawls meets the problem of distribution by declaring that a theory of justice must address the basic structure while being blind to individual situations. It is part of Rawls' idea of justice best dispensed by a citizen unbiased by personal awareness and concern. The Rawlsian citizen momentarily forgets who he is. Thus, it is better to leave justice to a structure rather than organic, fallible individual humans. "But," Rawls admits, "it seems impossible to design the legal rules so that they always lead to the correct result" (85). Insidious social artifacts will always invade the process, interjecting personal perspective and bias. Where humans are involved there can be no complete avoidance of human effects.

It seems that self interest is not just human folly that can be easily corrected, but a

powerful force of nature. Nonetheless, it is the role of reason to attempt to systematically ferret out injustice and strive for its correction. Rawls believes that this is best accomplished with a just socio-political structure, for an unjust structure prevents justice to exist in the particulars. A just super-structure allows for and encourages justice in the details. He reasons "only against the background of a just basic structure, including a just political constitution and a just arrangement of economic and social institutions, can one say that the requisite just procedure exists" (Rawls 87). To put it another way, Rawls insists on a structure that purifies the bias from men and women.

This is where his famous veil enters to propose a fundamental solution to the problem:

Somehow we must nullify the effects of specific contingencies which put men at odds and tempt them to exploit social and natural circumstances to their own advantage. Now in order to do this I assume that the parties are situated behind a veil of ignorance. They do not know how the various alternatives will affect their own particular case and they are obliged to evaluate principles solely on the basis of general considerations.

(Rawls 136-137)

The Rawlsian is denied knowledge of certain particular facts. He has no knowledge of his place in society, his assets, or how he fares in the distribution of assets. He has no knowledge of the strength of his culture in the global scheme. In other words, in all ways that humans now leverages their positions for advantage of every sort, the Rawlsian citizen is ignorant in the interest of fairness and justice. How this could be achieved is

quite a problem, for the present state of the world is one of competition. For capitalism to adopt the Rawlsian way would be to change it beyond recognition. The veil would disassemble the American political system where winners must pile advantage upon advantage in order to turn their ideology into action. Perhaps the only way to make the veil of ignorance work would be to use it in a general way to guide the development of general restrictions that would encourage individuals and institutions to behave in less biased ways. A strict veil is impossible, thus we are forced to consider a reasonable or workable veil.

Rawls achieves this by setting aside particulars and working to conceive a general structure. Then, in a stance that reminds one of the necessary educated citizen in Western democracy, Rawls calls for a participant rather like Plato's guardians:

It is granted that they know the general facts about human society. They understand political affairs and the principles of economic theory; they know the basis of social organization and the laws of human psychology. (Rawls 137)

This is all well and good but for the implication it carries with it for cultural and temporal predispositions. No knowledge comes without the fingerprints of its originators, transmitters, and receivers. Political affairs, economics, social organization, and human psychology from the perspective of whom? Would not the mere usage of the perspectives from one dominant culture be a powerful method of insuring that culture's continued dominance. It's rather like when a disaster breaks out in Africa and the BBC hands a microphone to a well-educated European observer to explain the situation in a way that seems correct and reliable. Never mind the fact that there are plenty of African

participants and observers who have a much deeper and more correct analysis. Their view might be in danger of conflicting with the Euro-American editor's view of what is an authoritative analysis (or analyst) of social, political, and human forces.

It could also be said that the veil's real function is to limit what is known in a particular situation. This limiting strips many of the details from the particular so that it will fit the general principle. Full knowledge of a situation gives it back its richness of detail. This detail creates the bumps that must be smoothed away before it will fit into the mold of justice. This idea is reinforced by Rawls comment that "the veil of ignorance makes possible a unanimous choice of a particular conception of justice" (140). Indeed, unanimity is necessary for a fundamental principle to be accepted as true. The smoothing away of detail as a result of an intentional ignorance makes the solution workable in a broad variety of situations.

Oddly, in the practical working of the veil, Rawls says that "the cumulative effect of social and economic legislation is to specify the basic structure" (259). Here we have the development of basic structure from particular situations. It is determination of basic structure by precedent (not unlike the American system we have now).

Easy? Possible? Perhaps not. But Rawls' veil is a firm step in the direction of an easily understood principle that can be carried around the world in the service of a more just global society. As Rawls points out:

To each according to his threat advantage is not a principle of justice. If the original position is to yield agreements that are just, the parties must be fairly situated and treated equally as moral persons. The arbitrariness of the world

must be corrected by adjusting the circumstances of the initial contractual situation. (141)

Here Rawls gives us a collection of sentences we can carry in our hip pockets as a guide to fair thinking and action in a variety of settings anywhere in the world. Culturally biased or not, it seems to be a rather fair attempt at a universally applicable criteria (and as many peoples in the world would politely point out, we would do well to begin with using it at home in our dealings with those in the periphery, whether they be people in other countries or our own marginalized residents.)

With that final phrase we must jump to Robert Nozick, for his deeply expressed appreciation for Rawls theory becomes uneasy when words like "binding rule effectively enforced" are used. He refers to Rawls' solution expressed above as "the supposed obligation to cooperate in the joint decisions of others to limit their activities. The principle of fairness, as we stated it following Hart and Rawls, is objectionable and unacceptable" (Nozick 93). Nozick then proceeds to give one of his familiar illustrations, this one consisting of a neighborhood public address system which is heard by all and supported by all. Each neighbor must participate by giving time to supply programming. What if one would rather go hiking and refuse to play music and tell jokes over the neighborhood PA? Nozick finds more and more contradictions with the system until it finally becomes bogged down in a mass of unworkable complications.

Like many of Nozick's illustrations, such as the grain of sand on Coney Island and a man on Mars, he turns to the extreme to make his point. This device frequently puts him in the position of using a strawman-like argument to demolish his opponent. No doubt

this is one of the reasons he has generated so much negative commentary from other philosophers over the years. However, that may not be the most important point. These illustrations hint at a deeper complication in the foundations of his positions.

Nozick holds tightly to a Lockean concept of private property, the ownership of unheld things. His extreme examples may unwittingly serve to show just how hard it is to find anything that is unheld these days (although this writer acknowledges that a thinker of Nozick's stature is unlikely to be unwitting about much). How is it possible to find anything, make anything, even think anything without standing on someone else's property or upon their shoulders? Indeed, it was probably just as hard to find unheld things in Locke's time. The success of Lockean ownership was, particularly in America, due in no small part to the fact that Lockeans were bringing a sophisticated personal one-owner philosophy into a land where ownership was unknown or of little importance. Our difficulty today in finding unheld things may be largely due to our widening awareness of peoples and ideologies which are not allowed or do not allow much benefit under the Lockean system. Locke works for Europeans in an era of world domination by the West. As that era wanes, or is at least questioned, the Lockean view of property comes under some uncertainty. With it wobbles the ideologies that eschew cooperation, especially coerced cooperation. Fierce individualism--the beacon of American ideology--is hard to defend in a world that is interdependent and interconnected to the highest degree. The current argument one hears in the debate over global community often goes between acknowledging this interdependency and responsibility, or ignoring it in order to implicitly reactivate an old advantage.

On the other hand, Nozick makes an important counterpoint to Rawls. Perhaps Rawls is best read with Nozick nearby to raise a cautious forefinger. (And isn't this exactly as the American two-party system would have us predisposed!) Nozick makes much sense when he writes "you may not decide to give me something, for example a book, and then grab money from me to pay for it, even if I have nothing better to spend the money on" (95). Of course, no one is going to expropriate your money in exchange for a book, but they very well might demand your money to pay for schools to educate the children in your city. This is the sort of thing Nozick is alluding to, yet when the absurd example is replaced with its real-life counterpart, the force of his argument evaporates. Unwanted books are not the same as the futures of children or the educational quality of the community. While Nozick seems, at first, to be unmasking tyranny, he winds up looking a bit suspicious, as if he is hiding some other kind of tyrannical advantage.

Walzer has, what seems to this writer, a rather simple principle for the avoidance of tyranny, which, after all, is what this discussion of the ill effects of global capitalism is based upon. Walzer's quote of Pascal states it well: "Tyranny is the wish to obtain by one means what can only be had by another" (18). To correct this injustice, Walzer carefully partitions activities and institutions into separate spheres. Using power generated in one sphere to influence activities in another is, for Walzer, the root of the evil. It could also be said to be the root of capitalism (or practically any other source of power for that matter). The idea in a market economy is to leverage the power one gains from one activity in order to gain control in another. Exporting influence from one sphere to another, while trying to minimize opposition or regulation, is what capitalism is all about. It gets to the

fundamental of leverage, the basic principle in the economist's M-C-M' formula. By extending Walzer's tyranny, it could be shown that capitalism--or profit--comes from a kind of tyranny. I increase my price to you while minimizing the cost to me. You work for me and I pay you less than I receive for your work. This is the nature of profit. The just solution would be to situate this tyranny in a society where all have an equal chance at tyranny. Tyranny for the benefit of all. It could be another way of saying "opportunity for all" given that opportunity is really a chance at gaining leverage.

Walzer's ideas carry a fine analysis of and rebuttal to Nozick's position. Walzer states:

The building of fortresses, dams, and irrigation works; the mobilization of armies; the securing of the food supply and of trade generally--all these require coercion. The state is a tool that cannot be made without iron. (68)

While Nozick often argues from the standpoint of an individual who is weighing his desire to cooperate, Walzer regards cooperation as absolutely necessary to many of the indispensable functions of humans. In order to survive, or progress, or achieve some level of satisfaction, coercion is a necessary concession. Back to Hobbes we go. When the landscape is no longer one of plenty and discretion, but a consideration for survival or for advancement against aversive odds, the ideological position shifts. It goes from Locke to Hobbes, or, as might be suggested here, from Nozick to Walzer.

Walzer also has a difficult time accepting Rawls' two principles as a workable solution. He writes, "In a world of particular cultures, competing conceptions of good, scarce resources, elusive and expansive needs, there isn't going to be a single formula,

universally applicable" (Walzer 79). This is also a point that people experienced in international business often discuss. People from different parts of the world have widely varying conceptions of basic considerations like value, justice, share, good and bad. Political histories are rolled up with selected religious beliefs, social traditions, noble lies, and class considerations. Cultural and social perspectives are wildly complicated with myriad components interacting in confusing ways. As Walzer points out, "people don't just have needs, they have ideas about needs; they have priorities, they have degrees of need; and these priorities and degrees are related not only to their human nature but also to their history and culture" (66).

In a world where everything and everyone competes for advancement and survival, leveraging advantage outside its proper sphere is an insidious phenomena. The tendency is for "one good or set of goods" to be "dominant and determinative of value in all the spheres of distribution" (Walzer 10). This injustice is at the heart of all social conflict. It is a phenomena that can only be rooted out with a great deal of "iron." While Walzer does not propose a harsh or ruthless state, he dose propose one that must be very active. He feels that the greater danger in a democratic state would be that it would err on the side of letting those with advantage run too freely.

What is Walzer's basic technique for preventing the unjust mingling of spheres? It is to limit how one can apply the gains in one sphere to the opportunities in another. We will have to set aside the problem that no one knows how this partitioning could be carried out in practice, thus leaving Walzer's theory in a state of utopia. This should not cause us to abandon Walzer's ideas as a possible solution pattern for the future. It is quite possible

that the computerized future that Bill Gates envisions will communicate so thoroughly and quickly that methods of government presently unknown could partition with great accuracy. If this prospect sounds too “big brother-ish,” too controlling, it may well be because our current system so highly cherishes the right to leverage from one sphere to another.

The problem of partitioning of gains, when stated simply, sounds similar to Marx's problem with the Capital-Material-Capital relationship. While Walzer could hardly be called Marxist, his problem with power is rather similar to Marx's, and his solution of putting brakes on leverage to achieve equality is rather in the same direction as a Marxist solution. Walzer does make some comment on this supposition. He writes, "What Shakespeare and Marx objected to is the universality of the medium, not of the medium itself" (Walzer 97). The problem is with the commoditization of facets of life and society that ought not be subjected to monetary valuation. Walzer continues, "it's not implausible to hold that every valued thing, every social good, can be represented in monetary terms" (97). And so capitalism attempts to march forward, translating every possible thing into monetary value in order to extract the universal medium--capital. Capital is important because it is the universal medium. It allows a transaction to take place between any and every sphere. Capital allows for the commoditization of every conceivable thing and for that thing to be leveraged in order to gain control of another. Capital exists in order to make influence transferable one from sphere to another. Put in these terms, capital is directly opposed to Walzer's separation of spheres. Given that Walzer is on the right track, capital is the handmaiden of tyranny. The often recited American assumption that

fairness, democracy, and capitalism all go hand-in-hand could be a noble lie that is believed without much reflection. A more accurate view would be that the United States spends far less on the separation of spheres (such as protecting low income groups from the effects of market economy--health insurance, job security, proper wages, and so forth). This view would more successfully explain why the Western-style market economies that are being exported to developing countries are giving in to systems of extreme and unjust leverage by capital over worker rights and quality of life.

Writing fifteen to twenty years ago, Walzer and Nozick both recognize the possibility of a future global society, but back away from it. Nozick sees states as tied to geographical areas. The notion of a society in need of governance, yet without borders, is something that he does not seem to consider, a notion that is endemic to CMC. However, Nozick's approach to an organic relationship between men and enterprise would likely be the most natural fit with the currently developing global economic system, which as we have seen, is now the base of power in the world. Nozick's minimal state, while receiving a great deal of criticism during the past two decades, may well be the design most closely fitting what will probably happen as societies try to manage global economics. It is also the system most lacking in compassion.

Walzer presents an interesting idea that might lead one to consider that the disintegration of state powers under global pressures is a positive step toward a more workable future:

The only plausible alternative to the political community is humanity itself, the society of nations, the entire globe. But were we to take

the globe as our setting, we would have to imagine what does not yet exist: a community that included all men and women everywhere.

(29)

Yet, that is exactly what is coming into existence today via CMC and borderless capital: a community that includes all men and women everywhere. The challenge is to devise ways of extending the ideals of just society--to insure the future of fairness--into all corners of the globe. The powerful fingers of Western capital and American guided CMC, now actively operating practically everywhere, will be the conveyor of justice or tyranny. It is unlikely that business acumen, or economics, or even a knowledge of the history of what has been will give humankind the answers on how to accomplish this entirely new and important task. The job may well fall to philosophy and the umbrella of interdisciplinary endeavors that it has traditionally embraced. That is where many of the leaders of the computer industry are looking for answers. And for good reason. It is hard to see where the job could realistically be assigned to any other single discipline.

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





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IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (QA-3)



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